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Abstract
This thesis uses laboratory and field experiments to examine the underlying motiva-
tions that drive biased and discriminatory behaviour. Its focus is on the differential
treatment of others that stems from individuals’ preferences for particular social and
ethnic groups. The unifying theme of this thesis is the exploration of how such discrim-
inatory tastes can manifest themselves within individuals’ social and other–regarding
preferences, determining the extent to which they care about the welfare of others. The
prevalence and implications of these types of preferences are considered in both market
and non–market settings.
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This thesis uses both laboratory and field experiments in order to advance our un-
derstanding of the motivations that underpin biased and discriminatory behaviour.
Its primary focus is the analysis of ‘taste–based’ discrimination, or the differential
treatment of others stemming from an individual’s preference for a particular social or
ethnic group (Becker, 1971). The unifying theme of this thesis is the exploration of
how such discriminatory tastes can manifest themselves within individuals’ social and
other–regarding preferences, affecting the extent to which they care about the welfare
of others (Chen & Li, 2009).
This short introductory chapter is designed to briefly set the intellectual landscape,
and is organised as follows. Section 1.1 motivates the experimental methods employed
in this thesis, and summarises the recent debate regarding the strengths and weaknesses
of lab and field methodologies. Section 1.2 briefly discusses common laboratory and
field experimental methods used in previous studies of discrimination. Section 1.3 gives
an overview of Chapter 2. Section 1.4 outlines Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 is introduced
in Section 1.5.
1.1 Motivating the experimental method
Experiments are particularly well suited to the task of examining taste–based discrim-
ination and testing the behavioural theories regarding how these tastes might be ex-
pressed. Experiments afford the researcher the control to identify causal effects and
allow the consideration of empirical regularities that might support, or refute, theo-
retical predictions. Importantly, experiments allow behaviour to be examined across
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institutions (Smith, 1994) in a tightly controlled setting. The laboratory provides an
ideal environment in which theory can be tested rigorously, granting an abstract envi-
ronment in which to reduce the possible confounds that are found in field data. This
grants the researcher a level of control unattainable in observational data.
However, many researchers have begun to question the robustness of results obtained
from the laboratory, and have begun to recognise their limitations. As highlighted by
Levitt & List (2007), the laboratory setting has many inherent properties which may
have undesirable consequences for behaviour, or that may affect the generalisability of
any conclusions. Features such as experimenter scrutiny, the self–selection of partici-
pants into the lab and the artificial restriction placed on choice sets may all influence
the way in which subjects behave. Studies have now begun to explore the implications
of these attributes in more detail (Winking & Mizer, 2013; Stoop et al., 2012; Stoop,
2014). Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 expands on this discussion considerably.
The criticisms and concerns raised about the generalisability and interpretability of
laboratory experiments has triggered a heated debate in the literature (Camerer, 2015;
Al-Ubaydli & List, 2015). This has led many researchers to now regard natural field
experiments, those that are conducted in natural settings where subjects are unaware
their behaviour is being scrutinised, as the gold standard for testing economic theory
and establishing causal treatment effects (Al-Ubaydli & List, 2015).1 Although some
researchers view lab and field methodologies as competing, the majority view them as
complementary.2 The ‘scientific view’ as defined by Camerer (2015), and the view taken
in this thesis, is that all empirical work, experimental or otherwise, contributes to a
general economic theory that seeks to explain how individuals respond to incentives.
1.2 Experiments in the discrimination literature
Experiments have been used to study discrimination for decades, with the literature’s
main objective largely being to distinguish taste–based discrimination, as proposed by
Becker (1971), from statistical discrimination, as formulated by Phelps (1972). The
ability to distinguish between these competing explanations is important for determin-
ing market efficiency (Schwab, 1986) and the extent to which individuals are behaving
1Harrison & List (2004) provide a comprehensive discussion of the various types of field experiment.
2Al Roth provides a well rounded discussion of these issues in his slides from the 2006
ASSA meeting, which can be found at the following address: https://web.stanford.edu/ al-
roth/papers/LabVersusField.Roundtable.ASSA.Jan.2006.pdf.
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rationally. This is therefore important for the formulation of policy proposals.
Previous work has employed various laboratory and field experiment methodologies,
including correspondence and audit methods, but has also utilised observational data
to shed light on these two very different motives. The literature has considered discrim-
ination against a number of identities in a range of settings, including gender and racial
discrimination in labour markets (Goldin & Rouse, 2000; Bertrand & Mullainathan,
2004), ethnic discrimination in housing markets (Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2008) and
discrimination against the disabled in the market for car repairs (Gneezy et al., 2012).
In the lab, there is a considerable body of research that focuses on discriminatory
behaviour. Researchers have employed methods such as the exogenous revelation of
surnames (Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001) and the country of origin of subjects (Whitt
& Wilson, 2007), in order to determine if subjects condition their behaviour on the
identity of others. However, to better understand taste–based discrimination, experi-
menters have turned to study artificially induced identities, categorising subjects into
random, or arbitrarily assigned, social groups and then studying how they interact.
These methods are often seen as preferable to the study of natural identities as they
allow the experimenter to control the identity that guides behaviour, and thus avoid
the complexities and confounds inherent in the study of natural identity. It is argued
that such methods allow the study of identity effects per se (Chen & Chen, 2011). This
work, building on the social psychology work of Tajfel et al. (1971) and Tajfel & Turner
(1986), was pioneered in economics by Charness et al. (2007) and Chen & Li (2009).
However, this literature has faced strong criticisms from Guala & Filippin (2015), Zizzo
(2010) and Zizzo (2012), who suggest the results of laboratory studies of discrimination
are often indistinguishable from experimenter demand effects.
In the field, the correspondence method represents one of the most well utilised
methodologies in the literature. Researchers using this method produce large num-
bers of identical CVs or letters and exogenously vary either the ethnicity, nationality
or gender of the applicant or author through the use of names, addresses or photos.
This method was brought to prominence by Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004), who
employed it to study discrimination against black job applicants. However, it has also
been used to study discrimination against those viewed as being less attractive (Ruf-
fle & Shtudiner, 2015), foreign nationals (Booth et al., 2012) and Muslims (Ahmed &
Hammarstedt, 2008). Researchers have also used ‘lost letter’ experiments, which fall
into this category of experiment, with similar successes (Ahmed, 2010a). A problem
with this type of study, as is often highlighted, is the inability to determine if treat-
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ment differentials are a result of taste–based or statistical discrimination, or even a
consequence of discrimination at all.
The audit study method also represents a workhorse within the discrimination lit-
erature. This method employs pairs, or groups, of individuals to complete simple
standardised interactions, such as bargaining for a car or interviewing for a job.3 The
experimenter varies the characteristic of interest, such as gender or ethnicity, within
the pair or group of employed individuals. This method has been widely implemented,
particularly in the study of hiring decisions, but more recent work has also focused on
the treatment of homosexuals and the disabled (Gneezy et al., 2012). However, many
assumptions about the unobservables that might be correlated with the variable of in-
terest must be made in order to distinguish behaviour from statistical discrimination
(Heckman, 1998).
1.3 Overview of Chapter 2
Chapter 2 builds on the social psychology research of Tajfel et al. (1971) and Tajfel &
Turner (1986). Its objective is to consider how a common sense of identity, or sense
of self, impacts reciprocal behaviour and in doing so examines a potential behavioural
channel through which discrimination might be expressed.
The experiment induces an artificial sense of identity into subjects by utilising a
group problem solving task. Following Chen & Li (2009) subjects are randomly assigned
to one of two groups, and in an initial stage can chat to their group members in order
to identify abstract paintings. Once this is complete, subjects play the gift–exchange
game of Fehr et al. (2007), playing as either Principals or Agents. Principals offer
Agents wages and ask for effort levels in an ‘incomplete contract’ and are given the
opportunity to reciprocate Agents ’ choices of effort by paying unenforceable bonuses.
Using a within–subjects design the experiment varies whether subjects play with an
in–group player, or an out–group player.
The results suggest that an induced sense of identity has no effect on behaviour, and
subjects do not differentiate their behaviour conditional on the identity of others. We
conclude that the identity inducement procedure may have interacted with the framing
of the experiment, as although subjects playing as Agents do regard their social group
as being important, those playing as Principals do not.
3See Riach & Rich (2002) for a survey of audit studies.
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This chapter also provides a conceptual replication of Fehr et al. (2007), and includes
a treatment without identity. Interestingly, we find that reciprocal behaviour in our
replication is significantly smaller than in the original study. We use the original data
of Fehr et al. (2007) to structurally estimate inequity aversion parameters and find
subjects in the replication to be around 20% less inequity averse than in the original.
1.4 Overview of Chapter 3
Chapter 3 presents a field experiment that examines the nature and extent of discrim-
ination faced by Muslims. This is achieved by studying the behaviour of a previously
unstudied demographic: the poorest people in England, the residents of two housing
estates in the town of Rochdale. This chapter is interested in examining why individ-
uals from this particular demographic are likely to vote for and support anti–Muslim
policies.
In the experiment, subjects first divide £10 between two strangers. They then play
a Dictator Game, dividing £10 between themselves and a different stranger, with stake
sizes equal to up to 18% of their weekly income. The ethnicity of the receivers in each
game is subtly varied by providing subjects with surnames randomly drawn from the
electoral register for the surrounding area. The experiment includes a treatment where
receivers’ surnames are withheld, providing a baseline from which behaviour can be
parsed into either in–group favouritism or out–group negativity. This is an important
behavioural distinction, which the discrimination literature typically overlooks.
The results suggest that this demographic may support policies that discriminate
against Muslims as a result of out–group negativity, rather than a consequence of in–
group favouritism. We advance the literature on discrimination through the estimation
of a structural model of group–contingent social preferences (Chen & Li, 2009), which
we exploit to perform counterfactual simulations. The results provide a potential ex-
planation for the negative attitudes towards Muslims and a possible motivation behind
the documented discriminatory behaviour against them.
1.5 Overview of Chapter 4
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to examine the prevalence, and extent, of other–regarding
preferences in transactions completed in a highly competitive market place, and deter-
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mine the role played by reputational concerns in fostering other–regarding behaviour.
It also examines how ethnicities interact and influence pro–social behaviour. This is
done using a natural field experiment.
To achieve this, we employed testers of varying ethnicity to take a number of prede-
termined taxi journeys. In each case we endowed them with only 80% of the expected
fare. Testers revealed the amount they could afford to pay to the driver mid-journey
and asked for a portion of the journey for free. In a 2×2 between–subjects design we
vary the length of the journey and whether drivers have reputational concerns or not.
We find that the majority of drivers give at least part of the journey for free and
over 25% complete the journey. Giving is found to be proportional to the length of the
journey, and the drivers’ reputational concerns do not explain their behaviour. Evidence
of strong out–group negativity against black testers by both white and South–Asian
drivers is also reported. In order to link our empirical analysis to behavioural theory
we structurally estimate the parameters of a number of utility functions. We find that
drivers’ other–regarding preferences are group–contingent, as proposed by Chen & Li
(2009).
This chapter makes a number of contributions. First, it adds to the debate sur-
rounding the generalisability of results obtained from laboratory experiments. Second,
it contributes to the other–regarding preference literature, by providing the first field
evidence that such preferences can, and do, influence behaviour in market settings
(DellaVigna, 2009). Finally, it contributes to the discrimination literature, and sheds
further light on how discrimination can manifest itself within our preferences.
14
Chapter 2
Group Identity and Reciprocity: A
Laboratory Experiment
2.1 Introduction
Since the work of Akerlof (1982), reciprocity has been a central topic of research for
many economists. The notion of ‘gift-exchange’ between economic agents, that employ-
ers pay higher wages to induce greater efforts from workers, has become a stylised fact,
with a number of authors suggesting that reciprocal motives are prevalent. Researchers
have suggested that reciprocity can stop markets clearing (Fehr et al., 1993, 1998a),
explain why individuals reject bargaining offers that would otherwise make them bet-
ter off (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), and provide an explanation for why people contribute
to public goods and punish those who don’t (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2000a). There is also
field evidence to support the gift-exchange hypothesis (Falk, 2007; Kube et al., 2012),
although the field experiments of List (2006), and Gneezy & List (2006) question the
generalisability of the laboratory results.
Reciprocity has been studied in many different settings (Berg et al., 1995; Fehr
et al., 1998b) but has gained particular traction in the incomplete contracting literature,
notably in its use as a contract enforcement device (Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2000b): workers in
experimental labour markets appear to exert greater levels of ‘effort’ when experimental
employers are able to reward or punish their behaviour. Andreoni et al. (2003) suggest
that punishments, rather than rewards, provide the most powerful incentives, although
the more recent work of Fehr et al. (2007) highlights how discretionary, reciprocal
rewards can be just as effective. The field experiments of Kube et al. (2012) support
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this result. In support of the conclusions of Fehr et al. (1997), it appears as though
strong, positive reciprocity can act as a powerful norm enforcement device and result in
significant efficiency gains. Even if only a fraction of the population exhibit reciprocal
preferences, theory suggests that even purely selfish agents can be induced to exert more
effort because of the expectation of reciprocity from their employer (Fehr & Schmidt,
1999).
Fehr et al. (2007) (herein FKS) is one of the most well published, and well cited stud-
ies within the incomplete contracting literature.1 FKS is a study designed to compare
the performance of ‘complete’ incentive contracts with ‘incomplete’ bonus contracts ex-
perimentally. Complete contracts are enforced normatively, whilst incomplete contracts
are enforced by reciprocity. Subjects are first given a role as either a Principal or an
Agent : Principals select which contract to offer to an Agent, complete or incomplete,
and then specify the contract details. By offering an incentive contract, the Principal
offers the Agent a wage, and a potential punishment if they choose too low an effort
level, which is verified with some probability by a third party. In contrast, by employing
a bonus contract, the Principal offers the Agent an unconditional wage and the Prin-
cipal can propose a non-binding bonus payment, which she can pay at her discretion
upon observing the Agent ’s effort choice. In both contracts, the Agents ’ effort choice is
costly, but positively impacts the Principals ’ payoff. The main conclusion of the paper
is that Principals reward Agents ’ efforts in a reciprocal manner and this promotes a
more efficient outcome than the subgame perfect prediction.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we conduct a conceptual replication of
FKS in a Replication study, designed to re-examine the almost decade old conclusions
of FKS.2 Following FKS, Principals offer a contract, Agents exert an effort and then
Principals can pay a bonus at their discretion. The experiment consists of ten periods
with perfect stranger matching, removing any possibility of reputation building. In
order to test the robustness of FKS’ results, we make one small design modification
by removing the Principals’ ability to select incentive contracts. As the overwhelming
number of contracts selected in FKS are incomplete bonus contracts (between 80%
and 96% of choices in a given period of the experiment), if reciprocal motives are as
strong as previously suggested, there is no reason to believe that giving Principals the
1The study is published in Econometrica and has over 400 citations.
2The definition of conceptual replication is taken from Crandall & Sherman (2016). The differences
between exact and conceptual replications lie in how the experiments are implemented: a conceptual
replication uses a different procedure to the targeted original study, whereas an exact replication follows
the procedure of the targeted original study exactly.
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opportunity to select between complete and incomplete contracts should unduly alter
their behaviour. Our experiment is also computerised using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007),
in contrast to FKS, which was conducted using pen and paper.
Second, we conduct an Identity study, where we experimentally induce subjects into
artificial social groups. This is done to allow us to examine how a sense of group identity
(Akerlof & Kranton, 2000) might affect reciprocal behaviour. Following the enhanced
group paradigm of Chen & Chen (2011) and Chen & Li (2009), before subjects are
assigned their role as Principal or Agent, they are randomly and anonymously assigned
to one of two arbitrary groups, the Red or Green group. They then complete a task
in which they can communicate with members of their group in order to identify six
abstract paintings. Based on the results of Chen & Li (2009), a common sense of
identity induced in this manner is hypothesised to increase reciprocity in ‘in-group’
interactions, or when they are matched with members of their own group, but decrease
reciprocity in ‘out-group’ interactions. Previous studies have examined the effects a
common sense of identity has on behaviour in public goods games (Drouvelis & Nosenzo,
2013), trust games (Falk & Zehnder, 2013), prisoners’ dilemma games (Goette et al.,
2006) and dictator games (Whitt & Wilson, 2007), with all reporting significant in–
group favouritism. We contribute to this literature by analysing the effect of a common
identity in a gift–exchange game.
We report a number of findings. First, the results from the Replication study support
the main conclusions of FKS. However, we find that reciprocity is not as strong as
previously reported. In contrast to FKS, an overwhelming majority of subjects in
the role of the Principal exhibit purely selfish behaviour. Where FKS report only
21% of Principal decisions as being selfish, we report 60%. Our experiment supports
their results qualitatively, but not quantitatively. On average, we find reciprocity to
be around 40% smaller than the original study, and significantly different. Although
we cannot conclusively say why this is the case, we conclude that it is likely to be a
consequence of procedural and subject pool differences, as discussed in Section 2.4.
Second, we find little evidence that a common sense of identity has any significant
affect on behaviour: no significant differences are reported between choices in the iden-
tity and replication treatments. Further, both Principals and Agents behave identically
towards both in–group and out–group members. Although this finding contrasts with
much of the published literature, additional analysis reveals the induced identity may
have interacted with the framing of the experiment, with Agents found to be more
greatly attached to their group than Principals. This finding, that identities are mul-
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tifaceted and may interact in ambiguous ways, is in line with the recent homophily
literature (Charness et al., 2014).
We make an additional contribution by estimating inequity aversion utility parame-
ters structurally. We do this using both the original FKS data and the data from both
our studies. This is done in order to compare parameter estimates between studies,
but also to examine if these behavioural parameters are group–contingent (Chen & Li,
2009), or vary between in–group and out–group interactions. In line with the reduced
form results, parameter estimates are significantly different between the Replication
study and FKS, with the Principals in FKS found to be more inequity averse. No
evidence that in–group or out–group identities affect Principals’ preference parameters
is reported.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reports the experi-
mental design and procedure. Section 2.3 provides some brief behavioural predictions.
Section 2.4 presents the results, and Section 2.5 presents structural estimates. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental design
The experiment was designed to examine the reproducibility of the reciprocity results
of FKS and examine if a common, artificially induced identity could be used to fos-
ter reciprocal behaviour. Both studies followed the precise framing, parametrisation,
session size and payoff structure of the original study by FKS in order to maximise
comparability.
2.2.1 Replication study
Twenty subjects were recruited to each session, and were randomly and anonymously
assigned to the role of either Principal or Agent. There were 10 subjects assigned to each
role, which was maintained for the entire session. Each Principal was matched to each
Agent exactly once, in a random order. Subjects completed 10 experimental periods per
session and each period incorporated fully random, perfect-stranger matching, in order
to remove the possibility for reputation building. Subjects received feedback about the
outcome of each period and were paid for each period, as in FKS.
Each period consists of three stages. At t = 1, the Principal offers a contract to
the Agent or not. If not, the game ends and both players receive zero payoffs. If she
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Stage Principal Agent
t = 1 Offers a contract, (w, e∗, b∗).
t = 2
Observes the contract, (w, e∗, b∗),
chooses e ∈ [0, .., 10].
t = 3
Observes effort, e, chooses
b ∈ [0, .., 100].
Table 2.1: Timing of the Bonus Contract
does offer a contract, she specifies a wage, w, demands an effort from the Agent, e∗,
and announces a bonus payment she could pay at t = 3, b∗. At t = 2, the Agent
observes the contract and must choose an effort level, e. This effort can be different to
demanded effort, e∗. Although effort is costly to the Agent, incurring him a cost c(e),
where c(e) = e
2
5
, his effort choice increases the Principal’s payoff by a factor of 10. At
t = 3, the Principal observes e, and she decides on a bonus payment, b, which can differ
to b∗.
Payoffs for the Principal, piP , and payoffs for the Agent, piA, are
piP = 10e− w − b (2.1)
piA = w − c(e) + b (2.2)
Following FKS, the choice sets were limited to integer values, with e ∈ [0, 10],
w ∈ [0, 100], e∗ ∈ [1, 10], b∗ ∈ [0, 100] and b ∈ [0, 100].3 Table 2.1 outlines the timing of
each period. Table 2.2 outlines the effort–costs faced by the Agents for each possible
effort level.
The sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game is b = 0, e = 1, and w = 0; e∗
and b∗ can take any value, and Agents are assumed to treat this communication as
cheap talk. Further Nash equilibria exist where w ≤ 10, and e = 1. In Section 2.3 we
briefly describe the behavioural predictions from the inequity aversion model of Fehr &
Schmidt (1999), as in FKS.
Effort, e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Effort-Cost, c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20
Table 2.2: The Agents’ Effort-Cost Table
3When e = 0, the Agent rejects the contract, the game ends and both players receive a payoff of 0.
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In total, we ran 4 sessions with 20 subjects in each, who all completed 10 periods.
This gives a total of 400 contract offers from 40 Principals ; this compares favourably
to FKS, who ran 2 sessions, and collected 198 observations from 20 Principals.
2.2.2 Identity study
The identity study followed the replication study exactly, but added an additional
stage prior to the 10 periods of the bonus contract being completed. Following the
enhanced group procedure of Chen & Chen (2011), participants were first randomly
and anonymously assigned to one of two groups, the Red or the Green group. Group
sizes were equal to control for potential minority-group effects (Tsutsui & Zizzo, 2014).
Subjects then completed a group problem solving task.
The problem solving task required subjects to first privately study six paintings,
three by Paul Klee and three by Wassily Kandinsky. Subjects were then shown four
additional paintings which they had to try to identify within a five minute time limit,
earning £0.80 for each correct answer. To enhance the sense of group identity, subjects
could anonymously communicate with their own group using a chat program. No
feedback was given on the number of correctly identified paintings until the end of the
session, to control for any income effects. Subjects were never told which paintings
they correctly identified, and were not aware of the nature of the task that would follow
this procedure.4 This procedure, as shown by Chen & Li (2009), is designed to make
group identity salient to the subjects and is more likely to influence behaviour than the
minimal or near–minimal group paradigms.
Once completed, subjects then played 10 periods of the bonus contract, as outlined
in Section 2.2.1. Half the subjects assigned to the role of Principal were Red, the other
half Green; the same for Agents. As each Principal is matched to each Agent exactly
once in a random order, we always observe half in–group (Red/Red and Green/Green)
and half out–group (Red/Green Green/Red) interactions per subject, per session. We
conducted 4 sessions in total.5
At the end of each session, following the literature (Chen & Li, 2009; Ioannou et al.,
2015; Turner, 1975), we asked participants to answer the following question: “On a scale
from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to your own group throughout the
4These pictures, and all experimental materials, are given in Appendix A.1.
5Due to subjects failing to show up, we completed 2 sessions with 20 subjects and 2 sessions with
16 subjects. The sessions with 16 subjects only completed 8 periods of the bonus game to avoid
re-matching.
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experiment”, with 1 meaning “not at all” and 10 meaning “very much so”. We use this
measure of group attachment to provide some indication of how successfully identity
was induced. This measure will also allow us to examine how identity might interact
with the subjects’ role, as either Principal or Agent.
2.2.3 Summary
Study Group Task Bonus Contract Sessions Matching Subjects
Replication X 4 No Identity 80
Identity X X 4 In-group/Out-group 72
Table 2.3: Summary of Studies
Table 2.3 summarizes the two studies and the differences between them. Before the
sessions began, subjects were read instructions aloud and were required to complete
exercises to ensure that they understood the task (see Appendix A.1 for all experi-
mental materials). All sessions were conducted at BEEL (Birmingham Experimental
Economics Laboratory) at the University of Birmingham UK during the Autumn Term
of 2013. The sessions lasted for around 90 minutes, and subjects earned £13.90 on
average; maximum earnings were £29, whilst the lowest were £5.20. The sessions were
conducted using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007), which contrasts to Fehr et al. (2007), who
conducted their experiments using pen and paper.
2.3 Behavioural predictions
In this section we examine the predictions of the outcome based model of inequity
aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Due to the sequential nature of the game, behaviour
in Stages t = 1 and t = 2 is unlikely to representative of any underlying preference,
so focus is placed on the Principals ’ choice of bonus payment in the final stage, Stage
t = 3.
If the Principal, P , is assumed to be inequity averse, her utility is assumed to be
a function u : pi → R, where pi = (piP , piA) denotes the vector of monetary payoffs. As
defined in Section 2.2, the Principal’s payoff is denoted as piP and the Agent ’s as piA.
The utility function for the Principal, uP , is assumed to take the following form,
uP (pi) = piP − αPmax{piA − piP , 0} − βPmax{piP − piA, 0}. (2.3)
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If the Principal is purely selfish, then βP = αP = 0. However, if βP > 0 and αP > 0,
the Principal will seek to equalise Principal and Agent payoffs, piP = piA. This gives
the following utility maximising choice of bonus payment,
b = max
{






when piP > piA, zero otherwise. As shown, bonus payments are predicted to be
increasing in effort and decreasing in wages. In Section 2.5 we structurally estimate the
behavioural parameters of the proposed utility function using the experimental data.
The recent work of Chen & Li (2009) suggests that the Principals ’ preference pa-
rameters, αP and βP , are functions of the group identity of the individual with whom
they are interacting, or are group–contingent. Let g ∈ {I, O} be an indicator function,
with g = I when the Agent is In–group, and g = O when the Agent is out–group.
We can then write each utility parameter as functions of identity: βgP and α
g
P . Given







P , suggesting Principals’ have a greater preference for equal payoffs
when faced with an in–group Agent.
2.4 Results
In this section, we first compare the Replication study to the results of FKS. Data
reported from FKS is taken from the bonus contracts of the Bonus–Incentive treatment,
which was downloaded through the Econometrica website.6 We then examine the data
from the Identity study and analyse it for any effects stemming from an induced group
identity.
A number of common features are present throughout: where non-parametric tests
are given, the p-value and test used are both presented in parentheses. Unless stated
otherwise, these tests are always two sided and the null hypothesis is that there is no
effect. Following FKS, all comparisons are made using observations at the individual
level.7
6We were able to estimate all reported results in the paper exactly.
7The results do not change significantly if session level observations are used instead.
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2.4.1 Replication study
Table 2.4 reports summary statistics from the Replication study, alongside those from
FKS to allow for ease of comparison. Table 2.4 presents Period 1 averages, and pooled
Period averages, from both studies. Figure 2.1 plots the evolution of the variables over
time, for both the Replication study (Figure 2.1a) and for FKS (Figure 2.1b).
Study Replication FKS
Period 1 Average Period 1 Average
Wage w
13.35 14.6 16.7 15.2
(10.85) (10.84) (7.52) (6.8)
Demanded Effort e∗ 6.59 7.1 6.3 6.7
(2.51) (2.38) (1.59) (2.04)
Announced Bonus b∗ 12.49 21.9 21.4 25.1
(11.05) (17.19) (6.73) (10.4)
Effort e
5.08 3.6 5.55 5.3
(2.49) (2.83) (2.46) (2.76)
Bonus b
5.84 3.3 11.45 10.4
(6.12) (6.31) (8.37) (10.9)
Contracts 37 376 20 198
Subjects 37 40 20 22
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. FKS data taken from the
bonus contracts of the Bonus-Incentive treatment.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics
Result 1: The behaviour of Agents in Period 1 is the same across studies. How-
ever, Principals’ behaviour in Period 1 of the Replication study is significantly different
to that observed by FKS.
Support. In Period 1, we observe significant differences in wages, announced bonuses
and bonus payments (p < 0.01, in all cases, Sign Tests). Demanded efforts in Period
1 and initial effort choices are equal across studies, and statistically indistinguishable
(p > 0.1, in both cases, Sign Tests). The significant differences in bonus payments is
easily discerned in Figure 2.1.
Result 2: Principals reciprocate higher effort levels with larger bonus payments.
However, reciprocal behaviour is significantly smaller in the Replication Study in com-
parison to FKS.
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Figure 2.1: Wages, Efforts and Bonuses by Period
Support. On average, wages, announced bonuses and demanded efforts are not
significantly different at the 5% level (p = 0.08, p = 0.15, p = 0.43, Sign Tests),
although wages are significantly different at the 10% level. On average, contract offers
are reasonably similar between studies. However, average efforts and bonus payments
are significantly different between studies at the 1% level (p < 0.001, in both cases, Sign
Tests). Figure 2.2 plots the distributions of bonus payments; FKS report less than 40%
of all bonus payments being zero, whereas we report 60%. This difference is statistically
significant (p < 0.05, Binomial Test).
To support the non–parametrics, Table 2.5 presents a number of OLS and Tobit
regressions. Models i, ii and iii present estimates using data from the Replication
study that follow the analysis of FKS exactly: in each model the dependant variable
is the bonus payment and, guided by the behavioural predictions in Section 2.3, we in-
clude wages, demanded efforts, announced bonuses and efforts as explanatory variables.
Models iv, v and vi present estimates taken from FKS.
From models i, ii and iii, the estimated coefficient on effort is positive and highly
significant and is robust across models. However, the estimated coefficient on effort is
around half the size of that estimated by FKS, and in each model we can reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficient on effort is the same as the corresponding FKS estimate
(p < 0.001 in all cases, χ2 Test). Reciprocity is not as large as reported in FKS.
Additional differences are also reported in Table 2.5, such as the negative and sig-
nificant correlation between announced bonuses on bonus payments (p < 0.01, model
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Figure 2.2: Distributions of Bonus Payments
i and iii, χ2 Tests). This contrasts with FKS, who find that announced and actual
bonuses correlate positively and insignificantly, rather than negatively.
Insight into the potential source of the differences between studies can be gained
from Results 1 and 2. First, the contract offers of Principals are incredibly similar
between studies, and the initial behaviour of Agents is identical to that observed in
FKS. This suggests that, at least initially, subjects in the role of an Agent, in both
studies, have similar beliefs about the behaviour of Principals in Period 1. However,
the largest difference between studies is observed in the bonus payment, the decision
that reveals the Principals’ preference for reciprocity and the least strategic choice
within this setting. The study differential in bonus payments begins in Period 1 and
persists until the final Period, which suggests that Principals are simply less reciprocal
in the Replication study than in FKS.
One explanation for the difference between studies might be found in the differences
in the way the experiments were conducted. Here we computerised experiments using
zTree, whereas FKS utilised pen and paper, the former perhaps providing greater ab-
straction away from human interaction. In line with the recent findings of Malmendier
et al. (2014), it may be that this resulted in the ‘external’ motivations of subjects being
different between studies. For example, as the subjects in FKS interacted with the
experimenter more often due to the pen and paper procedure, they may have perceived
greater social pressures that encouraged them to behave more reciprocally.
Alternative explanations might be due to the fact that this study was conducted in
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Study: Replication FKS
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Effort 1.549*** 1.549*** 3.296*** 2.86*** 2.86*** 5.54***
(0.153) (0.206) (0.369) (0.20) (0.33) (0.55)
Demanded Effort 0.135 0.135 -0.182 0.33 0.33 -0.59
(0.106) (0.152) (0.317) (0.38) (0.46) (0.77)
Wage -0.056** -0.056 -0.136 -0.3*** -0.3* -0.54**
(0.028) (0.044) (0.093) (0.1) (0.17) (0.24)
Announced Bonus -0.039*** -0.039* -0.181*** 0.12* 0.12 0.11
(0.013) (0.021) (0.043) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Constant -1.623** -1.623 -7.553*** -5.58*** -5.58*** -14.55***
(0.744) (1.062) (2.549) (1.88) (2.59) (3.68)
Observations 376 376 376 198 198 198
Note: The dependant variable is the bonus payment. ***, ** and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parentheses. Models (i) and (iv) are OLS
regressions with robust standard errors. Model (ii) and (v) are OLS regressions with robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level. Model (iii) and (vi) are Tobit regressions
with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level, lower censored at 0. FKS
estimates are taken from authors own estimates, but are also available in regressions (1),
(2) and (3) from (Fehr et al., 2007, pp 139).
Table 2.5: Determinants of Bonus Payments
the UK, and FKS was conducted in Germany. They were also conducted around eight
years apart. Therefore, we cannot rule out cultural factors stemming from nationality
or having developed over time, as driving the differences between studies. Finally, the
Replication study also differs in that Principals are unable to offer complete ‘incentive
compatible’ contracts to the Agents, as in FKS. Although an unlikely explanation, we
cannot rule out the possibility that the removal of this design feature adversely affected
Principals ’ reciprocity.
2.4.2 Identity study
We now present the results from the Identity study. Table 2.6 presents summary statis-
tics, disaggregated by In–group and Out–group interactions. Similar to the summary
statistics in Table 2.4, we present both Period 1 averages and averages across periods.
Result 3: A common induced sense of identity has no effect on the Principals’ or
Agents’ behaviour.
Support. Comparing first period contract offers, no significant differences are re-
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Matching: In–group Out–group
Period 1 Average Period 1 Average
Wage w
11.2 13.37 14.4 12.94
(7.04) (8.51) (12.25) (8.93)
Demanded Effort e∗ 6.29 6.48 6.6 6.48
(2.3) (2.17) (2.21) (2.13)
Announced Bonus b∗ 12.14 18.44 12.7 18.68
(12.62) (13.83) (12.6) (13.8)
Effort e
4.14 3.73 3.65 3.56
(1.75) (1.67) (2.25) (1.61)
Bonus b
3.21 3.53 4.6 2.98
(3.58) (4.41) (6.21) (4.04)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2.6: Summary Statistics


















Figure 2.3: Wages, Efforts and Bonuses by Period
ported when comparing in–group wages, demanded efforts or announced bonuses to
those offered to the out–group (p > 0.1 in all cases, Robust Rank Order Tests). This
is despite out–group Agents being offered higher wages in Period 1 in comparison to
in–group Agents. Similar results are reported for efforts and bonus payments, with
no significant differences reported (p > 0.1 in both cases, Robust Rank Order Tests).
On average, no significant differences are reported in contract offers, effort choices or
bonus payments (p > 0.1 in all cases, Robust Rank Order Tests). The similarities are
highlighted graphically in Figure 2.3.
Further support for Result 3 is provided in Table 2.7, which presents the estimates
from a number of regressions. In each model, the dependent variable is the bonus
27
payment, and we include identical explanatory variables as those outlined in Table
2.5, with the addition of a dummy controlling for Out–group interactions (1 if yes, 0
otherwise) and the interaction between effort and the Out–group dummy. In–group
interactions are taken as the baseline.
Table 2.7 outlines how the coefficient on the out–group dummy is never significant
at conventional levels (p > 0.1, in all cases, χ2 Tests). The interaction between effort




Effort 1.304*** 1.303*** 2.83***
(0.245) (0.316) (0.604)
Effort × Out–group -0.175 -0.175 -0.07
(0.357) (0.397) (0.577)
Demanded Effort -0.181 -0.181 -0.642
(0.147) (0.182) (0.431)
Wage -0.019 -0.019 -0.137
(0.029) (0.047) (0.099)
Announced Bonus 0.05 0.05 -0.052
(0.037) 0.062 (0.119)
Out–group 0.466 0.466 0.111
(0.869) (0.999) (0.194)
Constant -1.623** -0.919 -5.613**
(0.744) (0.945) (2.666)
Observations 309 309 309
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels. The dependent variable is the bonus
payment. Standard errors in parentheses. Model
(i) is an OLS regression with robust standard errors.
Model (ii) is an OLS regression with robust standard
errors clustered at the individual level. Model (iii) is
a Tobit regression with robust standard errors clus-
tered at the individual level.
Table 2.7: Determinants of Bonus Payments - Identity Study
Result 3 suggests that an induced group identity has no effect on behaviour. This
is in contrast to many papers that report significant differences resulting from random
assignment to arbitrary groups (Chen & Li, 2009; Chen & Chen, 2011; Drouvelis &
Nosenzo, 2013; Eckel & Grossman, 2005; Ioannou et al., 2015). One explanation for
this is that the experimental identity manipulation was not strong enough, or that group
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identities may have interacted with the framing of the experiment. To examine this, we
consider the subjects’ self–reported group attachment, as is standard in the literature.

















Note: Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.4: Average Self–Reported Group
Attachment
It is clear from Figure 2.4 that Agents report feeling closer to their group than do
Principals. The difference is also found to be statistically significant (p < 0.01, Robust
Rank Order Test). This may explain why Principals do not treat in–group Agents
better than out–group Agents : they do not feel as closely attached to their group.
Rather than the identity manipulation being unsuccessful, it appears as if the non–
neutral framing of the experiment interacted with the group identity of the subjects.
This finding would be consistent with the recent results of Charness et al. (2014), who
find that an induced group identity is not enough to overcome an unanticipated ‘status’
identity that was potentially induced by differences in subjects’ productivity. In our
study, although Principals may have identified with their group they may not have
identified with subjects in the role of Agent perhaps as a consequence of a perceived
status. This status effect likely stems from the fact that Principals earned significantly
more on average than Agents (£17 versus £7 respectively).
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2.5 Structural estimates
In this section, we conduct a structural analysis in order to link our results to be-
havioural theory. Specifically, we estimate the behavioural parameters proposed in the
model of inequity aversion in Section 2.3. However, we are only able to estimate the
advantageous inequality parameter, β, from Equation 2.3, as in every observed con-
tract, before the bonus payment is made, the Principals ’ payoff is always greater than
the Agents ’. Implicit in the analysis is the assumption that Principals are making their
decision in isolation, or that subjects are ‘narrow bracketing’. Thus we assume they
are not taking into account the total income of the Agent or themselves. It has been
suggested that this may result in greater estimates of ‘fair’ behaviour than if they were
assumed to ‘bracket broadly’, and considered total incomes (Read et al., 1999).
For a given bonus payment, b = x, when piP > piA, each Principal derives utility
uP (b = x) = 10e− w − x− β (10e− w − x− (w − c(e) + x)) . (2.5)
Following the estimation strategy of Chen & Li (2009), to estimate β, we assume
Principals select a bonus payment, b = x, with the following probability






where uP is the utility function specified in Equation 2.5 and λ is a noise parameter.
We assume a random utility model, rather than a random preference model, due to the
assumed linearity of the utility function (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). When λ → 0, the
Principal makes perfectly random choices over the set of possible bonus payments,
b ∈ {0, 1, ..., 100}. As λ → ∞ the Principal makes a perfectly rational choice, given
her utility function. We estimate β and λ using maximum–likelihood estimation, with
the results presented in Table 2.8 under the Replication Study heading. For comparison
purposes we provide the inequality aversion parameter estimates using the FKS data,
which have not previously been estimated. These estimates are presented in Table 2.8
under the FKS heading.
In addition, following the behavioural literature, we specify the Principals ’ advan-
tageous inequality parameter, β, as a function of in–group and out–group identity to
allow us to test for group–contingent social preferences (Chen & Li, 2009; Chen & Chen,
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2011). We specify β as a function,
β = β(1 + aI + dO) (2.7)
where I is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the Agent is In–group, and O
takes a value of 1 if the Agent is Out–group, both 0 otherwise. Therefore, parameters a
and d capture the additional utility weight placed on the Agents ’ payoff when they are
either in–group, or out–group. We interpret β, which captures the preference parameter
estimated from the Replication study, as being the social preference parameter where
identities are group–neutral (Chen & Li, 2009). These estimates are presented in Table
2.8 under the Identity Study heading.
Model : Replication Study FKS Identity Study
Parameter
β 0.244*** 0.284*** 0.251***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.121)






Observations 400 202 728
Log–Likelihood -936.8 -608.7 -1683.6
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are given
in parentheses. Estimates are of the parameters of the Fehr &
Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion.
Table 2.8: Structural Parameter Estimates
First, the estimates of β and λ in all models are positive, and highly significant (p <
0.001 in all cases, χ2 Test). However, comparing the results between the Replication
study and FKS, reveals that β is significantly different across studies (p = 0.003, χ2
Test), as is λ (p < 0.001, χ2 Test). Although β is estimated to be around 16% larger
in FKS, suggesting greater average levels of inequality aversion, the differences in λ
suggests FKS subjects randomise over the set of bonus payments to a greater extent
than those in the Replication study. Parameter λ estimated from the FKS data is less
than 50% the size of λ estimated using the Replication study data. The estimates of β
also support the reduced form conclusions in Section 2.4.8
8Our estimates of β, from both the Replication study and FKS, are in line with the median values
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The Identity study estimates are also in line with the results in Section 2.4: in–group
and out–group identities have no significant affect on the Principals’ preferences, with
both a and d not found to be significantly different from zero (p > 0.1 in both cases,
χ2 Tests).
2.6 Conclusion
We report the results of experiments designed to replicate the results of Fehr et al.
(2007). Although we find evidence that supports the qualitative evidence of Fehr et al.
(2007), we find that subjects are significantly less reciprocal than subjects in the orig-
inal study, with reciprocity estimated to be around 40% smaller. Structural estimates
reveal subjects preferences to be significantly smaller in our study in comparison to the
original.
We also find that an induced group identity has little influence on reciprocity in this
particular laboratory setting. The data suggests that this is a result of an interaction
between the identity manipulation and the framing of the experiment; Agents feel more
closely attached to their group than the Principals, potentially due to a status effect.
Although this appears to go against some of the literature on identity, it is in line with
the homophily literature. Our result outlines how identity is likely to be complex and
multifaceted even when induced (Charness et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014), and shows
how it is not always clear which sense of identity will be made salient. However, we
acknowledge that we cannot rule out the possibility that the identity manipulation was
unsuccessful.
In conclusion, we find that subjects are less reciprocal than previously reported.
This is most likely attributable to subject pool differences, and slight differences in
the experimental procedure. Specifically, we believe a move from a pen and paper
based procedure to one conducted on a computer may have induced greater ‘external
motivations’. Pen and paper based experiments involve far more interaction with the
experimenter, which may induce subjects to behave more prosocially than they would
otherwise. This conclusion is in line with the conclusions of Malmendier et al. (2014),
that external motivations likely play an important role in shaping reciprocal behaviour.
As recently highlighted in the replication studies of Camerer et al. (2016), only further
replication of experimental findings can shed light on their robustness.
of β that are typically estimated and assumed. See, for example, Blanco et al. (2011).
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Chapter 3
Discrimination in a Deprived
Neighbourhood: A Field
Experiment*
“They’re not coming to this country
if I’m president”
— Donald J. Trump, 2015
3.1 Introduction
Donald Trump, the Republican Party presidential candidate, was recently branded a
bigot and a racist for his proposed policy of banning Muslims from entering the United
States (Milibank, 2015). His comments were described as “hate speech,” and the United
Kingdom’s House of Commons debated banning him from entering the country after
a petition calling for his ban was signed by 500,000 people.1 Similar anti–Muslim
sentiment was at the heart of the recent election of the London Mayor, Sadiq Kahn
and the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign during the British referendum on EU membership. For
example, those standing in opposition to Sadiq Kahn made a number of allegations
linking him to Muslim extremist groups, and Vote Leave directed significant attention
1The petition, parliamentary debate and discussion can be viewed through the UK’s Parliamentary
Petition website: https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/114003.
*The field experiment reported in this chapter was conducted in collaboration with Brit Grosskopf.
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to potential increased immigration from Muslim countries in order to promote anti–EU
sentiment.2
The similarity between the campaigns is likely not a coincidence, as supporters
of both Trump and Vote Leave appear to share similar views and are from a similar
demographic. As highlighted by a number of pre and post–referendum polls, voters
most likely to have supported Vote Leave are white, have low levels of education and
earn low incomes.3 The same appears to be true for the supporters of Donald Trump
(Thompson, 2016). Further, surveys suggest that 30% of British voters would support
policies that reduced the Muslim population (Townsend, 2012), and around 27% believe
Islam is incompatible with the values of British democracy. This latter view is found
to be correlated with respondents incomes and level of education (Page, 2009).
However, little is known about why individuals from this particular demographic
might support policies that discriminate against those with Islamic heritage. This is
largely because there is little research into the behaviour of the poorer, less educated
population, with previous work into discrimination against Muslims typically focusing
on better educated and more wealthy individuals that are less likely to be supporters of
such policies. For example, Ahmed (2010b) reports evidence of discrimination in trust
and dictator games against non–Europeans in an experiment utilising Swedish univer-
sity students. Ahmed & Hammarstedt (2008) find that landlords in the Swedish housing
market discriminate against tenants with Muslim sounding names in comparison to ‘na-
tive’ names. Ahmed et al. (2009) find that small business sellers are less likely to contact
potential buyers if they have Muslim sounding names. Kaas & Manger (2012) report
similar evidence of discrimination by hiring committess in the German labour market
towards those with Turkish sounding names. Booth et al. (2012) report comparable
results from the Australian labour market against those with names of Middle Eastern
origin. However, the strategic nature of the interactions in these studies means that
2A number of newspaper articles demonstrate this point. For example, Hinsliff (2016) reports
on Sadiq Kahn’s competitors trying to link him to an ISIS sympathiser. The former UKIP party
leader, and prominent figure in the Vote Leave campaign, Nigel Farage, posed with a billboard poster
of Muslim refugees with the slogan, ‘Breaking Point’ (Wright, 2016), and Vote Leave ‘appealed to
prejudice’ by claiming Turkey was about to join the EU and that its citizens posed a threat to UK
national security (Boffey & Helm, 2016).
3Three separate studies support this. The Lord Ashcroft Poll information on voter
demographics: http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-
why/; the Telegraph newspaper poll: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016 /06/22/eu-




individuals may be using ethnic stereotypes in order to inform their decisions, making
preference (Becker, 1971) and statistical (Phelps, 1972) explanations of discrimination
difficult to disentangle.
In contrast to field studies, lab experiments provide a more tightly controlled en-
vironment in which statistical and taste–based explanations of discrimination can be
more easily parsed. Experimenters have employed a range of strategic and non–strategic
games in order to distinguish between the two competing explanations, but also to de-
velop new behavioural theories of discrimination. Recent studies suggest that individ-
uals’ social preferences are group–contingent, or that the extent to which individuals
care about others depends on the degree to which they identify with them (Akerlof &
Kranton, 2000; Chen & Li, 2009). Individuals have been found to behave more chari-
tably (Chen & Li, 2009; Whitt & Wilson, 2007), cooperatively (Drouvelis & Nosenzo,
2013; Falk & Zehnder, 2013; Goette et al., 2006; Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2006) and coordinate
more efficiently (Chen & Chen, 2011) when interacting with those they perceive as the
‘in–group’, in comparison to the out–group. A stylised interpretation of these findings
is that individuals exhibit favouritism towards the in–group, rather than negativity
towards the out–group, what Bernhard et al. (2006) call parochialism. As noted by
Becker (1971), this is an important behavioural distinction, and as suggested by Ahmed
(2007), many studies that conclude that individuals exhibit in–group favouritism omit
a treatment where interactions are ‘group neutral’ (Falk & Zehnder, 2013; Fershtman
& Gneezy, 2001; Goette et al., 2006; Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2006; Whitt & Wilson, 2007), and
so are unable to parse behaviour into in–group favouritism or out–group negativity.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the potential motives underpinning the
behaviour of a previously unstudied demographic, poor and less educated white-British
individuals, and determine if their support for anti–Muslim policies could be a result
of taste–based discrimination (Becker, 1971). This is achieved using a door–to–door
field experiment conducted in the poorest areas in England, two housing estates in the
town of Rochdale. The residents of these estates were chosen because they are highly
representative of the demographic of interest: they are white, have received little formal
education and have very low incomes. Many of those who took part in our experiment
live on incomes as low as £57 per week, with some subjects living in neighbourhoods
that endure unemployment rates of 100%.
Subjects were first asked to make distributional choices in Other–Other games,
where they had to divide £10 between two anonymous individuals. Following the social
psychology experiments of Turner (1978), this was done in order to make their ethnicity
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salient. They then played a single Dictator Game, dividing £10 between themselves
and a receiver. Similar to Fershtman & Gneezy (2001), and the lost letter experiments
of Ahmed (2010a), the 3×1 between–subject design subtly varies the ethnicity of the
individuals that subjects are allocating money to by providing them with surnames
taken from the local electoral register.4 The surnames were categorised into either
English or Muslim ethnic origin using the taxonomy of Mateos et al. (2007). These
allocation decisions are then compared to the decisions from an Anonymous baseline
treatment, where the receiver’s surname is withheld, allowing us to distinguish between
in–group favouritism and out–group negativity. As we study a non–standard subject
pool, the experiment satisfies the artefactual field experiment criteria of Harrison &
List (2004).
In the Dictator Game, we find that subjects give around £5 to receivers with sur-
names of English origin, £2 to those with surnames of Muslim origin and £5 to those
in the Anonymous treatment. Individuals with surnames of Muslim origin are treated
worse than someone who is Anonymous, whilst those with surnames of English origin
are not treated more favourably. Thus, in contrast to the conclusions of the majority of
the literature we find no evidence of in–group favouritism, but instead report evidence
of out–group negativity. This is a particularly interesting finding, as anti–immigration
and nationalist groups often associated with this demographic employ slogans or names
that focus on the in–group, and imply that they are promoting in–group favouritism,
rather than supporting out–group negativity.5
To link our empirical analysis to behavioural theory, we assume that subjects give in
the Dictator Game because they have social preferences, and that these preferences are
group–contingent (Chen & Li, 2009). Structural parameter estimates reveal that social
preferences are 87% smaller when subjects are giving to a receiver with a surname of
Muslim origin in comparison to receivers in the Anonymous treatment and those with
surnames of English origin. In Section 3.6 we conduct a counterfactual simulation using
the preference parameters we estimate, and discuss how they could provide an expla-
nation for our subjects’ potential support of discriminatory policies. Our conclusions
may also provide insight into the results of Ahmed & Hammarstedt (2008), Booth et al.
4Experiments into gender differences conducted by Holm (2000) preceed those of Fershtman &
Gneezy (2001) and use a similar method, but utilise forenames rather than surnames in order to study
gender.
5For example, consider the right–wing British organisation, Britain First, or nationalist policies
promoted in the UK such as ‘Buy British’ or phrases such as ‘British Jobs for British Workers’.
36
(2012), and the discrimination faced by Muslims reported in the press.6
In the Other–Other games we find that when allocating money between two individ-
uals with surnames of contrasting ethnic origin, one English and one Muslim, subjects
allocate around £1 more to the individual with the surname of English origin regardless
of the ordering of the surnames. Although this result resonates with the minimal group
literature (Turner, 1978; Chen & Li, 2009), we cannot determine if this behaviour is
driven by in–group favouritism or out–group negativity.
This study makes a number of contributions. First, we contribute to the discrim-
ination literature by examining the behaviour of a previously unstudied population.
Second, we provide some of the first evidence into the potential motives underpinning
the behaviour of this novel demographic. Finally, we provide a potential behavioural ra-
tionale for why these individuals might discriminate by modelling ethnic discrimination
as being a consequence of group–contingent social preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 gives details of the
study population, Section 3.3 outlines the experimental design, Section 3.4 outlines the
results, Section 3.5 presents a structural model, Section 3.6 provides a counterfactual
analysis, and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Subject pool
The subjects in our experiment are drawn from two population areas, Falinge and
Kirkholt, two housing estates situated in Rochdale, England, a town located in a wider
region that has a recent history of ethnic tensions (Carter & Midlane, 2012; Syal &
Topping, 2014). The extent of unemployment in these areas is most evident from
the English Indices of Deprivation, a five yearly publication from the UK Government’s
Office of National Statistics (ONS). The report ranks small highly localised populations
in terms of relative deprivation. At the time the study took place (2014) the Falinge
and Kirkholt housing estates were ranked in the top 0.3% of the most income and
employment deprived populations in the country. The Falinge estate was ranked first
out of 32,482. It was determined to be the most deprived area in both these domains.7
6For example, Syal & Topping (2014) report on taxi customers in Rochdale requesting ‘local’ (white
British) drivers over the phone, rather than Asian–Muslim drivers.
7In the latest 2015 report, other locations have become relatively more deprived. However, these




Estate Census No. Claiming No White Income Employment
Area Households Benefit‡ Education†
Falinge
F1 177 85% 31% 40%
1st 1st
F2 215 100%* 44% 60%
Kirkholt
K1 132 75% 44% 82%
98th 50th
K2 120 65% 31% 66%
K3 150 85% 36% 79%
K4 136 55% 36% 80%
Source: Office of National Statistics, English Indices of Deprivation 2010, UK Census 2011 and
own calculations. The Output Area codes used within the Census are removed for anonymity
reasons. ∗The Census reports this figure as 120%, which is potentially attributed to fraudulent
benefit claims. ‡Percent of population claiming out of work benefits. †Percent of population
with no formal qualifications. Income and employment deprivation ranks out of 32,482. Higher
ranks imply greater levels of deprivation.
Table 3.1: Population Demographics
Table 3.1 provides information on the housing estates we study. Each estate is
divided into different areas by the UK Census, and the Table outlines the number of
households, the percentage of people without qualifications, the percentage of people
out of work and simplified ethnic demographics for each of these Census Areas. It is
evident that a significant number of residents are out of work, and a large proportion
have not obtained any formal qualifications. Deprivation rankings in the income and
employment domains are given in the final two columns.
Although a majority of residents from the two housing estates are white British
nationals, Table 3.1 highlights that a large number of residents are from non-white
minority ethnic groups. In one area in Falinge (area F1), non–white residents constitute
a majority of the population (60%). In contrast, far fewer minority ethnic groups
are present in the population of the Kirkholt Estate. The non-white populations in
Rochdale are predominantly categorised as being Asian: although this category is very
broad, incorporating many different ethnicities, the vast majority of this population
in Rochdale are of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin, with the second most commonly
stated religious belief after Christianity being Islam.
The town of Rochdale has also been in the press because of two child sex trafficking
and abuse scandals, one in 2012 (Bunyan, 2012) and a second in 2016 (BBC, 2016).
The terrible nature of the crimes and the failure of the Greater Manchester Police
to investigate the crimes meant the stories gained particular prominence. However,
because all the criminals involved were Asian men of Pakistani–Muslim origin, and all
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the victims were white British females, it has been suggested the crimes were racially
motivated. It has also been suggested that the Police failed to investigate because of
concerns about ethnic tensions and for fear of being called racist (Bunyan, 2012). The
Greater Manchester Police has since apologised for its failure to investigate the crimes
(BBC, 2015).
3.3 Experimental design
We study the other–regarding behaviour of white British nationals and how their be-
haviour is influenced by the English and Muslim ethnic origins of those they interact
with. This was achieved by conducting a door-to-door artefactual field experiment ad-
ministered to the population areas outlined in Section 3.2. All subjects first completed
a series of Other–Other Games, dividing £10 between two other people (Part 1). They
then played a single Dictator Game, where they allocated £10 between themselves and
a receiver (Part 2). All choices were made in whole pounds. Subjects then completed
a post experimental questionnaire.8
To vary the ethnicity of the individuals that subjects are allocating money to, we
provided them with their surnames. In an attempt to avoid any experimenter bias in
surname selection, we classified surnames taken from the Edited Electoral Register for
the Rochdale area into different groups of ‘ethnic and cultural’ origin using the ‘Cultural,
Ethnic and Linguistic’ taxonomy of Mateos et al. (2007). Only those surnames which
were classified as ‘Western European, English’ in origin (for example, Smith) and those
of ‘Muslim’ origin (for example, Islam) were used.9
Households that answered the door were read out a fixed script that outlined who
the caller was, and were asked if they would like to take part in an ‘Economic Decision
Making Study’. They were told they would receive £2.50 for taking part, and that they
had the opportunity to earn additional money. If a resident agreed to take part the
experiment was conducted at the door–step. Once finished, subjects were paid in cash.
The order in which streets were approached was randomised and only one person per
household was permitted to take part.
Subjects were told that once the study was completed those they were allocating
money to would receive payment in cash through the post, which they did. Subjects
8All experimental materials are included in Appendix B.1.
9These names are examples, and were not necessarily used within the study. Over 400 unique
surnames were employed. The surnames are not given for anonymity reasons.
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were aware that they were not allocating money directly to their neighbours as the
housing estates studied make up only a tiny fraction of the entire town of Rochdale.
Subjects were also told that they were allocating money to people who would not be re-
quired to make a decision, and that these people were not aware that they were involved
in the study. Any money they received would be a surprise. This was emphasised in an
attempt to mitigate the effect that subjects’ first order beliefs (their belief about the
receiver’s choice) and second order beliefs (their belief about the receiver’s expectation
of their choice) might have on their behaviour. These beliefs have been highlighted as
important for reciprocity in a number of studies (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Yamagishi
& Kiyonari, 2000). In order to control for the effects stemming from the commonality
of social group affiliation (Guala et al., 2013), subjects were assured they would remain
anonymous to the receivers.
In Part 1 subjects were asked to allocate £10 between two other people (‘Person A’
and ‘Person B ’), but were not able to allocate any money to themselves, and therefore
received no payment for their decisions. They were required to do this under three
schemes in which they were provided with the surnames of the two people they were
allocating money to. Subjects completed what we label an In–In, Out–Out and In–Out
scheme, in a random order. In the In–In scheme, subjects allocated £10 between two
people with surnames of English origin and in the Out–Out scheme the money was
allocated between two people with surnames of Muslim origin. In the In–Out scheme
money was allocated between one person with a surname of English origin, and one with
a surname of Muslim origin, the order of which was randomised between subjects to
control for any order effects. Subjects were informed that one scheme would be selected
for payment at random and that the two individuals from that scheme would receive
payment through the post. Subjects did not learn the scheme that was selected until
the experiment was completed. Part 1 is motivated by the minimal–group findings
of Turner (1978), who reports that Other–Other allocation choices can enhance the
salience of subjects’ identities in subsequent decisions.
In Part 2 subjects were asked to allocate £10 between themselves and a receiver,
an individual randomly selected from the Edited Electoral Register. The between–
subject design varied whether the receiver had a surname of English origin (English
Treatment), a surname of Muslim origin (Muslim Treatment) or if the surname was
withheld (Anonymous treatment). Each subject was randomly assigned to a treatment,
and the surname was unknown to the experimenter. Once they had made their choice
they were paid in cash. A £10 endowment was chosen as it is the ‘standard’ dictator
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amount (Engel, 2011), and thus allows for a comparison with previous studies.
To elicit background characteristics, subjects completed a post experimental survey
and self–reported a number of characteristics. However, the main survey question of
interest was one which aimed to measure group attachment and to check the experi-
mental manipulations were successful. In a manner similar to Yamagishi & Kiyonari
(2000), in the post experimental survey subjects were asked, ‘How close did you feel to
your match in Part 2, based on their surname alone? ’.10 Subjects were asked to make
a choice on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being ‘Not at all ’ and 10 being ‘Very much so’.
If ethnicity is important to subjects, then this measure of Closeness should register
increases (or decreases) relative to the Anonymous baseline.11 Table 3.2 provides a
summary of the experimental design.
Treatment Part 1 No Surname English Muslim Survey Observations
Anonymous X X X 38
English X X X 42
Muslim X X X 42
Table 3.2: Experimental Design – Part 2
The experiment was conducted between the hours of 12pm and 6pm during the
summer of 2014. A total of 16 full days across 4 weeks were required to collect all
the observations. The experiment was conducted by a single experimenter, who was a
white British male. A total of 828 individual addresses from the two housing estates
were approached, 341 residents answered the door, and 132 agreed to take part; 14% of
the total households in the six Census areas in Table 3.1 took part. We were unable to
recruit any additional residents: of the 487 addresses that did not answer the door, all
were approached an additional time at a later date. The 209 addresses which refused
to take part were not approached again.12
10In the Anonymous Treatment subjects were asked ‘How close did you feel to your match? ’
11This question is a variation of a question used by Turner (1978), “How much did you like the
people in your group?”, or of that used by Chen & Li (2009), “Please rate how closely attached you
felt to your own group throughout the experiment”.




This section outlines the experimental results. A number of common features are
present throughout: where non-parametric tests are given, the p-value and test used are
both presented in parentheses. Unless otherwise stated, the null hypothesis is always
that there is no difference in behaviour between treatments and all reported tests are
two sided.13 Only one person per household took part and each individual observation
is treated as independent. As the experiment was conducted over four weeks, subjects
may have heard about the study from neighbours or through social media, causing be-
haviour to differ over time. No evidence is found of a trend in behaviour over the course
of the experiment (p = 0.76, Cuzick’s Wilcoxon–like test for trend) (Cuzick, 1985) so
all observations are pooled.14
3.4.1 Dictator game
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics of the subjects’ self reported demographics and
choices.15 Figure 3.1 displays box plots of amounts given in each treatment.
Treatment Male Employed Income No Education Closeness Amount Given
Anonymous 57% 26% ≤£10,000 26% 2.95 4.05
(2.78) (2.88)
English 43% 22% ≤£10,000 44% 3.78 4.88
(2.78) (3.15)
Muslim 35% 19% ≤£10,000 29% 2.61 2.62
(2.65) (2.47)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Percent of subjects who have no formal qualifications.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Result 1 (Out–Group Negativity): In the Dictator Game subjects give around half
as much to those with surnames of Muslim origin in comparison to those with surnames
of English origin, and in comparison to those who are Anonymous.
13We use non-parametric Robust Rank Order tests instead of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests follow-
ing the analysis of Feltovich (2003).
14This test is commonly used in the medical literature.









Note:  represents the mean.
Figure 3.1: Amounts Given in the Dictator Game,
by Receivers’ Surname
Support. Table 3.4 presents the test statistics and p–values from the pairwise com-
parisons of distributions and medians between treatments. As shown, no significant
differences are reported when comparing how much was given to those with surnames
of English origin to how much was given to those who are Anonymous. However, when
comparing giving to those with surnames of Muslim origin to giving to those with sur-
names of English origin and to those who are Anonymous, significant differences are
found in both distributions and medians.
Comparison Alternative Hypothesis Test Statistic p–value
Distributions
HA: English 6= Anonymous χ2=1.366 0.266
HA: Muslim 6= Anonymous χ2=5.541 0.019 **
HA: Muslim 6= English χ2=11.637 0.001 ***
Medians
+
HA: English 6= Anonymous U´=-1.115 0.265
HA: Muslim 6= Anonymous U´=2.341 0.019 **
HA: Muslim 6= English U´=3.63 0.000 ***
Note: In each comparison the null hypothesis is always that there is no
difference between treatments. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
 Compared using Kruskall–Wallis Tests. Test statistics reported with ties.
+ Compared using Robust Rank Order Tests.
Table 3.4: Pairwise Comparisons of Dictator Giving
Table 3.5 presents estimates from a number of Tobit regressions. In each regres-
sion the amount given is the dependant variable, the Anonymous treatment is taken
as the baseline and we include dummies for the English and Muslim treatments. To
examine the robustness of the estimates, in each subsequent model additional dummies
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Dependant variable: Amount Given
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
English 1.169 1.16 0.978 0.394 -1.474
(0.907) (0.91) (0.947) (0.847) (1.322)
Muslim -2.051** -2.072** -1.972** -2.099** -2.601**
(0.919) (0.938) (0.986) (0.885) (1.26)
Male -0.165 -0.533 -0.559 -0.56
(0.757) (0.776) (0.689) (0.678)
Area 0.118 0.404 0.943 0.754
(0.753) (0.771) (0.691) (0.687)
Income 0.173 0.391 0.486
(0.72) (0.635) (0.627)
Employed 0.248 -0.467 -0.481
(0.985) (0.89) (0.887)
High School 0.933 0.878 1.038
(0.87) (0.778) (0.781)








Constant 3.846*** 3.878*** 2.691** 0.998 1.698
(0.657) (0.847) (1.143) (1.107) (1.18)
Observations 122 122 98 96 96
Note: Observations left censored at 0 and right censored at 10. Standard
errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level. The number of observations differs between models due to missing
entries. English and Muslim correspond to dummies for the English and
Muslim treatments respectively.
Table 3.5: Determinants of Amount Given – Tobit Regressions
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which take values of 1 for each of the following (and zero otherwise) are also included:
if the subject was male (Male), employed (Employed), educated to GCSE level (High
school), or A-level (A-level) and if the subject was from the Kirkholt estate (Area);
when the high school dummy and A-level dummy are both zero, the subject has no for-
mal qualifications.16 Income (Income) and the subjects’ self reported level of Closeness
(Closeness) are also included, along with Closeness interacted with the treatment dum-
mies. Supporting the non–parametric analysis, Table 3.5 outlines how the coefficient
on the Muslim dummy is always estimated to be negative and significant (p < 0.05, in
all regressions), with its magnitude robust to specification changes.
Although Result 1 resonates with the results of previous laboratory experiments, it
does not support the typically reported result that subjects exhibit favouritism towards
the in–group. Instead, Result 1 indicates how subjects exhibit negativity towards those
perceived as an out–group.
One explanation for why we do not observe in–group favouritism could be attributed
to the English treatment not being a strong enough experimental manipulation, or it
being unsuccessful at inducing an in–group sense of identity. To shed light on this,
we examine self–reported levels of group attachment, or Closeness, as is standard in
the literature (Chen & Li, 2009; Ioannou et al., 2015; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000).
Subjects are found to report feeling closest to those with surnames of English origin,
with Closeness in the English treatment found to be significantly different from that in
the Anonymous and Muslim treatments (p = 0.07 and p = 0.011, Robust Rank Order
Tests). This is despite behaviour being found to be identical in both the English and
Anonymous treatments, as outlined in Result 1. No differences in levels of Closeness
are reported when comparing the Muslim treatment to the Anonymous treatment (p =
0.65, Robust Rank Order Test). This suggests the English treatment was successful in
inducing an in–group sense of identity.
An alternative explanation may relate to the implicit and explicit attitudes of the
subjects. Subjects giving to an Anonymous receiver may have unconsciously believed
the receiver was ‘like them’, and therefore the same as someone with a surname of
English origin. Only when they are explicitly prompted to consider how ‘close’ they
16Five subjects reported having higher levels of education, including further and higher education
qualifications (Postgraduate and Graduate level). These, however, are not regarded as reliably self-
reported and are grouped with subjects with no education. The results do not change significantly if
these individuals are grouped with High School or A–level educated subjects.
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feel to someone with a surname of English origin do they exhibit favouritism. This is
likely captured by the significant, but small, effect of the interaction between Closeness
and the English treatment (Closeness×English) reported in Table 3.5 (p = 0.078, model
v). Thus, at least in this setting, in–group favouritism is only observed when explicitly
prompted.
3.4.2 Other–other games
Prior to the Dictator Game all subjects played three Other–Other games where they
were required to allocate money between two other people, Person A and Person B.
They made their choices under three schemes in a random order: the In–In, Out–Out
and In–Out scheme. In the In–Out scheme, subjects completed either an In–Out or
Out–In ordering. As shown in the experimental instructions given in Appendix B.1,
Person A’s surname was presented first and to the left, whilst Person B’s surname
was presented second and to the right. We disaggregate the In–Out scheme data by
orderings to identify any potential presentation effect.
Table 3.6 presents the results from each scheme, outlining the average amounts al-
located to Person A, Person B and the mean difference between these allocations. The
final row of Table 3.6 presents the results from two–sided Sign Tests used to examine
if these differences are significantly different from zero. The mean differences between
amounts allocated to Person A and Person B for all schemes are presented graphically
in Figure 3.2.
Scheme In–In Out–Out In–Out
Ordering Out–In In–Out
Person A Allocation £5.58 £5.73 £4.62 £5.85
Person B Allocation £4.42 £4.27 £5.39 £4.19
Mean Difference £1.16 £1.46 -£0.77 £1.7
(2.34) (2.43) (2.92) (3.29)
Observations 122 122 69 53
HA: Difference 6= 0 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p = 0.08 p < 0.001
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 3.6: Allocations in the Other–Other Games
Result 2 (Presentation Effect): When the surnames are of the same ethnic origin,







































Note: Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3.2: Other–Other Allocations
the person listed second (Person B).
Support. From Table 3.6, in both the In–In and Out–Out schemes, subjects give
significantly more to Person A than to Person B (p < 0.001 in both cases, Sign Tests).
Result 3 (Discrimination): When Person A and Person B have surnames of differ-
ent ethnic origins, subjects allocate more to the individual with the surname of English
origin. This is true even when the English surname is presented second. However, due
to the presentation effect, we only conclusively observe discrimination in the Out–In
scheme.
Support. It can be seen from Table 3.6 that subjects give more to the person with
a surname of English origin in the In–Out scheme, with the difference in both In–Out
and Out–In orderings being significantly different from zero (p = 0.001 and p = 0.08,
Sign Tests).
Further support for Result 2 and Result 3 is presented in Table 3.7, which outlines
estimates from OLS and Tobit regressions. In each regression, the difference between
amounts allocated to Person A and Person B is the dependent variable. Observations
from the In–In scheme are taken as the baseline, and explanatory variables include
dummies controlling for choices made in the Out–Out scheme, and the In–Out and Out–
In orderings of the In–Out scheme, taking values of 1 in each case (and 0 otherwise).
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Dependant Variable: Differences in Allocations to Persons A and B
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Out–Out Scheme 0.295 0.3
(0.241) (0.242)
In–Out Ordering 0.534 0.548
(0.488) (0.492)
Out–In Ordering -1.932*** -1.942***
(0.419) (0.421)
Constant 0.975*** 1.164*** 0.978*** 1.164***
(0.163) (0.213) (0.164) (0.212)
Observations 366 366 366 366
Note: Observations from the In–In scheme are taken as the baseline.
***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Reported standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Models
(i) and (ii) are OLS regressions, (iii) and (iv) are Tobit regressions.
Table 3.7: Other–Other Allocation Decisions
In support of Result 2, Table 3.7 outlines how the constant is estimated to be ap-
proximately 1 across models. The OLS regression results of model (ii) suggest that
Person A is allocated £1 more than Person B on average. This can be inferred from
the estimate of the constant. No differences are found between the In–In and Out–
Out schemes, with the coefficient on the Out–Out dummy never significantly different
from zero at conventional levels (p > 0.1, all cases). In support of Result 3, the coef-
ficient on the Out–In ordering dummy has a negative and highly significant coefficient
(p < 0.01). The estimates of model (ii) outline how, in the Out–In ordering, if Person
B has a surname of English origin, once the ‘Presentation Effect’ is accounted for, they
are allocated around £2 more than the individual with a surname of Muslim origin,
even when that individual is presented first.
Both Results 2 and 3 are in line with previous findings in the literature. The pre-
sentation bias outlined in Result 2 is well documented in the psychology literature.
In particular, there is considerable evidence of the tendency for subjects to gravitate
towards options presented on the left in comparison to those presented on the right
(Friedman et al., 1994; Weng & Cheng, 2000). However, although Result 3 is a replica-
tion of the findings of Chen & Li (2009) and Turner (1978), and outlines how subjects
differentiate between individuals conditional on their ethnicity, it is not clear how to
interpret the subjects’ behaviour. First, as there is no Anonymous baseline from which
to compare behaviour, the results could equally imply either in–group favouritism or
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out–group negativity. Second, as behaviour in the In–Out scheme is indistinguishable
from behaviour in the In–In and Out–Out scheme, we can only conclusively say that
discrimination is observed in the Out–In scheme. It is possible that this is a result
of a ceiling effect in how comfortable subjects feel when implementing inequitable out-
comes. If subjects already hit a ‘ceiling’ with respect to inequitable choices in the In–In
scheme, then it is unlikely we would then observe differences between this scheme and
the In–Out scheme, as subjects would be unwilling to tolerate any additional inequality.
Therefore, it is likely that we only observe discrimination in the Out–In scheme as the
motive to discriminate works in the opposite direction to the presentation effect.
3.5 Structural model
To link our empirical analysis to behavioural theory, we model subjects’ behaviour
structurally. Following the model of Cox et al. (2007), it is assumed that each subject
has utility
u(x;α, θ, ) =
α−1((s+ ω − x)α + θ(e,m)xα) if α ∈ [−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1](s+ ω − x)xθ(e,m) if α = 0 , (3.1)
which is derived from her own payoff and the receiver’s payoff. Her own payoff consists
of her participation fee, s = 2.5, plus the amount that she keeps for herself: her initial
endowment, ω = 10, minus the amount given to the receiver, x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 10}. The
receiver’s payoff, x, is the amount the subject decides to give. The social preference
parameter, θ(e,m), is a function that captures the utility weight the subject places on
the receiver’s payoff. Implicit in our analysis is the assumption that subjects are making
their decision in isolation, or that they are ‘narrowly bracketing’ their decisions, and
thus, are not taking into account the annual income of the receiver or themselves (Read
et al., 1999). Following Chen & Li (2009), we assume this parameter is a function of
the ethnicity, or identity, of both the subject and the receiver,
θ(e,m) = θ(1 + ae+ bm) + , (3.2)
where e and m are dummy variables, with e = 1 when the receiver has a surname
of English origin, and m = 1 when the receiver has a surname of Muslim origin,
and 0 otherwise. Following the behavioural literature, we interpret parameter θ as
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capturing the utility weight placed on the payoff of the receiver in a group neutral
interaction (Chen & Li, 2009). Thus, parameter θ represents baseline social preferences,
or preferences when the receiver is Anonymous. Parameters a and b, the English and
Muslim identity parameters, measure the additional effects of the receiver’s English
or Muslim ethnic origin on this weight. The function θ(e,m) is assumed identical
across subjects, except for an idiosyncratic error term, . Thus, following the analysis
of Apesteguia & Ballester (2016), we assume a random preference model rather than
random utility model.
Specifying utility in this way is advantageous in comparison to more restricted forms,
as the model nests many commonly assumed functional forms: when α < 1, indifference
curves are strictly convex, when α = 1 indifference curves are linear and subjects
are inequity averse (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and indifference curves converge to Cobb-
Douglas preferences as α→ 0. When θ(e,m) > 0, as α→∞ preferences are Leontief.17
Utility reverts to standard selfish preferences when θ = 0.18 Parameters could be
obtained from each of these nested forms by estimating the model with restrictions.
However, we let the model pick the parameter values that best fit the data and then
test to see if such restrictions would be valid. Appendix B.3 describes the strategy
employed to estimate the parameters in Equation 3.1 structurally, closely following the
procedure of Cox et al. (2007).
Table 3.8 outlines the parameter estimates and standard errors. We begin by testing
a number of parameter restrictions. First, note that α is estimated to be both positive
and highly significant (p < 0.01, Wald Test). It is found to be significantly different
from one (p < 0.01, Wald Test), suggesting that linear, inequity averse preferences do
not provide a good fit for the data. Similarly, θ is estimated to be positive and is highly
significant (p < 0.01, Wald Test), rejecting the notion of selfish preferences.
From Table 3.8, the estimate of the English identity parameter, a, is not significantly
different from zero at conventional levels (p = 0.33, Wald Test), although the Muslim
identity parameter, b, is negative and highly significant (p = 0.01, Wald Test). The
null hypothesis that a = b can be rejected at the 5% level (p = 0.03, Wald Test). Social
preferences towards receivers with surnames of Muslim origin are estimated to be around
87% smaller than social preferences towards those with surnames of English origin and
those who are Anonymous. As a is not estimated to be significantly different from zero,
17See Cox et al. (2007) for the proof.
18If α < 0, giving x = 0 would imply a payoff of u = −∞. As we observe a high number of x = 0 in
the data, we assume α ≥ 0.
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Note: ***, ** and * denotes significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table 3.8: Structural Parameter Estimates of Equation 3.1
subjects gain no additional utility from the payoff of individuals with a surname of
English origin in comparison to those who are Anonymous. However, as b is estimated
to be less than zero, subjects derive less utility from the payoffs of individuals with
surnames of Muslim origin in comparison to those who are Anonymous. The estimates
of a and b lend themselves to Result 1, supporting the idea that subjects exhibit out–
group negativity rather than in–group favouritism, and suggest that this negativity is
a consequence of group–contingent social preferences.
3.6 Counterfactual analysis
A number of important questions arise from our results: to what extent could our
structural model explain the attitudes of the demographic of interest? Could our results
provide an explanation for the reported discrimination against Muslims in both the
press and other studies? For example, the audit study of Ahmed & Hammarstedt
(2008) finds Swedish landlords accepting potential tenants with Swedish names more
frequently than those with Muslim names, and the anecdotal evidence of Syal & Topping
(2014) reports British taxi customers requesting white British drivers (“local” drivers)
instead of Asian–Muslim drivers. In each case, the individual incurs some cost, or
trades–off some of her income, in order to complete a transaction with someone they
view as in–group, rather than someone from the out–group.
To address this question, consider an individual, p, who must choose with whom
they will interact with in order to complete a transaction. They must select a strategy,
s1, from the strategy set S1 = {In,Out}, where strategy s1 = In implies they interact
with someone they perceive as an ethnically in-group player (of English origin), pI , and
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s1 = Out with someone they perceive as an ethnically out–group player (of Muslim
origin), pO. We assume that players pI and pO are identical except for p’s perception
of their ethnicity.
From strategy s1 = In, p earns ωIn = ω− c, and from s1 = Out she earns ωOut = ω,
where ω ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0. We assume it may be costly for p to choose an in–group
interaction, having to incur a cost in order to do so. This cost, c, can be thought
of as the cost of discriminating, or the amount of income individual p is willing to
forego in order to pursue in–group interactions. For example, when c > 0, the cost
could represent additional search costs associated with locating a shop run by an in–
group member, or the additional wait incurred when requesting an in–group taxi driver.
It could represent the cost associated with voting for a policy that causes personal
cost, but would allow the individual to avoid out–group interactions. Alternatively, it
could represent a landlord waiting for an in–group tenant to apply for tenancy of her
properties when only an out–group tenant is currently available. Thus, c could range
from very small to very large. If s1 = In, p
I earns a payoff of mIn > 0 and p
O earns
zero. We also assume if s1 = Out, p
I earns zero and pO earns mOut > 0. Figure 3.3









Figure 3.3: Extensive Form Representation
Assuming individual p’s utility, u : s1 → R, takes the form outlined in Equation 3.1,
with parameters equal to those estimated in Table 3.8, θ = 1.11, α = 0.72, b = −0.87,
a = 0, the extent to which she is willing to forego income in order to pursue in–group
interactions can be determined. Denoting s∗1 as the utility maximising strategy choice,
s∗1 = In when u(In) ≥ u(Out),
α−1((ω − c)α + θ(1 + a)mαIn) ≥ α−1((ω)α + θ(1 + b)mαOut). (3.3)





ω − [ωα + θ (m(b− a))] 1α if mIn = mOut = m (3.4)
ω − [ωα + θ (mOut(1 + b)−mIn(1 + a))]
1
α if mIn 6= mOut (3.5)
We can now consider when p will play s∗1 = In for given discriminatory costs and
other players’ payoffs. It is particularly interesting to consider how this choice differs
between individuals with group–contingent social preferences and those without dis-
criminatory tastes. Figure 3.4 plots Equations 3.4 and 3.5 graphically. Figure 3.4a
plots costs on the y axis, and the other players’ payoff m on the x acis. Figure 3.4b
plots costs on the y axis, and the difference between the other players payoffs, d, on
the x axis, where this difference is defined as d = mIn −mOut. In each figure the light
shaded areas characterise where s∗1 = In is played when the identity parameters are
a = 0 and b = −0.87, as estimated in Section 3.5. The dark shaded areas characterise
where s∗1 = In is played when the identity parameters are equal, a = b, or when social
preferences are not group–contingent. Thus, we can consider how behaviour diverges
by comparing light and dark shaded areas.
When mIn = mOut = m, as shown in Figure 3.4a, p will only play s
∗
1 = In when
a = 0 and b = −0.87. In this case there are no dark shaded areas because p is always
indifferent between strategies when the identity parameters are equal. However, as
characterised by the areas that are not shaded, even when p has group–contingent social
preferences, there still exist costs at which she would not be willing to discriminate.
When mIn 6= mOut, as shown in Figure 3.4b, p may be willing to play s∗1 = In
even when a = b, as highlighted by the dark shaded area. This is due to the positive
estimate of θ, which means that p would select the interaction that gave the highest
payoff to the other player, regardless of their group identity. Most interesting about
Figure 3.4b is that the light shaded area highlights how p would play s∗1 = In for many
negative values of d and even when the cost is high. This means that p would choose an
in–group interaction over an out–group interaction even when that interaction would be
more beneficial for an out–group player, and when the cost of selecting that in–group
interaction was very high.
The conclusions drawn from this counterfactual simulation could provide an expla-
nation for why this particular demographic may support discriminatory policies, even























(b) c(d), if d = mIn −mOut
Note: Shaded regions characterise where s∗1 = In
Figure 3.4: The Relationship Between
Discrimination and the Other Players’ Payoffs
insight into prior work that outlines discrimination towards Muslims. In particular,
the analysis could provide additional insight into the results of Ahmed & Hammarst-
edt (2008) and the anecdotal evidence of Syal & Topping (2014). Although statistical
explanations cannot be ruled out in these examples, the analysis highlights how in-
dividuals with group–contingent social preferences may be willing to incur significant
costs, or be prepared to trade–off large amounts of their own income, in order to avoid
out–group interactions.
3.7 Conclusion
We report evidence of individuals discriminating against those with surnames of Muslim
origin and demonstrate this to be a consequence of subjects’ social preferences being
group–contingent. We advance the literature through the estimation of a structural
model which we exploit to perform a counterfactual simulation, modelling how these
preferences may cause individuals to incur costs in order to avoid out–group interac-
tions. In doing so we provide a potential explanation for the documented attitudes of
individuals from the demographic we study.
Whilst the results are suggestive, we acknowledge that care should be taken when
trying to generalise the results to the behaviour of other populations and identities,
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and even to those who opted out of the experiment. For example, it may be that those
who agreed to take part in the experiment were more inclined to discriminate than
those who did not. Alternatively, as suggested by List (2006), those who participated
in the experiment may be more sensitive to experimental cues unaccounted for here.
However, such selection bias is unlikely to explain why we do not observe in–group
favouritism. The results do, however, serve as a sign that ethnic identities embedded
within surnames can have a significant effect on pro–social preferences.
Alternatively, the surnames we used could have signalled something else to the
subjects which we have failed to account for (Heckman, 1998). For example, although
we have focused exclusively on surnames as revealing ethnicity, Mitra & Ray (2014)
outline how group conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India and Bangladesh may
instead be the result of status differences. In our study population Muslims are a
minority, and it may be that they are perceived as being of a lower social status.
Instead of ethnicity, subjects may identify with people along these status lines. Whilst
determining if this is the case is beyond the scope of this paper, the result that subjects
exhibit group-contingent social preferences would still hold; the only aspect of the
analysis that would change is what constitutes the social group.
In conclusion, we report evidence that the discriminatory behaviour of a previously
unstudied demographic is a consequence of out–group negativity, rather than in–group
favouritism. We are able to determine this because of the inclusion of an Anonymous
baseline treatment, a crucial design aspect that is typically omitted. Our results may
mean that the findings of previous studies that omit this treatment may need to be
reinterpreted. In particular, the stylised conclusion that the differential treatment of
individuals is a consequence of, or primarily driven by, in–group favouritism may need
to be re–examined. Our results highlight how simple experiments can be used to un-





Preferences in the Market for Taxis*
4.1 Introduction
Although a large number of laboratory experiments detail the prevalence and signif-
icance of other–regarding preferences, there is limited field evidence that these pref-
erences have any implications for market outcomes (DellaVigna, 2009). Recent field
studies suggest laboratory experiments may exaggerate the extent and significance of
these preferences in social dilemmas (Stoop et al., 2012; Winking & Mizer, 2013), pos-
sibly as a consequence of experimenter scrutiny, the decision context, self–selection of
participants, stake sizes, or the artificial restriction of choice sets that the lab imposes
(Levitt & List, 2007). Other studies highlight the importance of reputational concerns
(List, 2006) and monitoring considerations (Bandiera et al., 2005; Benz & Meier, 2008)
in explaining what might otherwise be considered as other–regard in natural settings.
These criticisms and concerns raise serious questions about both the generalisability
and interpretability of laboratory experiments that measure other–regarding prefer-
ences, and the importance of these preferences for economic outcomes.
Other–regarding preferences also form the foundation for recent behavioural the-
ories of discrimination. Stemming from concepts of ‘taste–based’ discrimination first
detailed in Becker (1971), a prominent theory is that social preferences are group–
contingent, or that other–regarding preferences are larger towards those we identify
with (the ‘in–group’), in comparison to ‘out–groups’ (Chen & Li, 2009). Although this
*The field experiment reported in this chapter was conducted in collaboration with Brit Grosskopf.
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explanation has gained prominence, as with other work on social preferences, the ma-
jority of evidence in its support has been obtained from laboratory experiments (Chen
& Chen, 2011; Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2013; Goette et al., 2006; van Der Mewe & Burns,
2008). Field experiments, in contrast, largely suggest discriminatory behaviour can be
attributed to statistical discrimination (List, 2004; Levitt, 2004; Gneezy et al., 2012),
although some come close to identifying a taste (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Mujcic
& Frijters, 2013). In addition, the methods used for studying identity and discrimina-
tion in the laboratory have recently been criticised, with work suggesting the observed
behaviour is a consequence of experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010, 2012), or pos-
sibly stemming from a heuristic (Guala & Filippin, 2015), rather than being due to an
inherent preference.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the prevalence, and extent, of other–
regarding preferences in transactions that take place in a highly competitive market
setting, and determine the role played by reputational concerns in fostering other–
regarding behaviour. We also investigate the significance of ethnic identity in deter-
mining these preferences, and examine its interplay with individuals’ reputational con-
cerns. This is done using a natural field experiment whereby we employed 22 testers
of varying ethnicity to pose as passengers and take a number of pre–determined taxi
journeys.1 In each case we endowed them with only 80% of the expected fare. Once the
taxi meter reached 60% of the fare, testers told the driver that they only had a certain
amount, and asked if they could have the final 20% of the journey for free. The tradeoff
faced by a driver in this situation is analogous to the dilemmas that subjects typically
face in the laboratory: express other–regard at a personal cost but to the benefit of
another by giving some of the journey for free, or to behave selfishly but profitably by
stopping once the meter reaches the amount the passenger can afford. Although this
transactions is not competitive per se, as the passenger has no alternative driver with
which to interact, the taxi market setting we study satisfies all the requirements of a
market place, as discussed by Al-Ubaydli & List (2016). As such, the driver makes
his decision within a competitive context, and where the objective function is typically
assumed to be to maximise profits.
In a 2 × 2 between–subjects design we systematically vary the length of the taxi
journeys using Short and Long distance treatments, where testers took journeys of
approximately 1.7 miles and 4.4 miles. As drivers assigned to the Long distance treat-
1Under the taxonomy of Harrison & List (2004) our experiment is classified as a natural field
experiment.
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ment are able to give twice as much (in absolute terms) as drivers assigned to the Short
distance treatment, we can examine if the drivers’ other–regarding preferences depend
on the relative payoffs between themselves and the passenger, or if giving is constant
regardless of the amount available to give. Orthogonally to the distance treatments, we
vary whether the drivers’ reputations are a concern to them or not. Using a No Reputa-
tion treatment, testers signal the one–shot nature of the interaction to the driver. The
taxi markets we study have thousands of drivers, and tens of thousands of passengers
each week, making repeated interactions for infrequent customers incredibly unlikely;
these markets are therefore attractive for studying the ‘one–shot’ interactions required
for disentangling other–regard from reputational concerns. As described in Section 4.3,
the only real possibility of meeting a driver in a future interaction is by obtaining his
contact details so that he can be actively selected. Our Reputation treatment, similar
to the repeat business treatment of Schneider (2012), exploits this with testers asking
drivers for a business card so they can contact them for future journeys. Making drivers’
reputations salient will allow us to examine how the prospect of a repeated interaction
affects drivers’ other–regarding behaviour.
We find that 70% of drivers in the No Reputation treatment give part of the journey
for free, with more than 25% completing the journey at no extra cost to the tester. We
also find that the extent of giving is proportional to the length of the journey. Drivers
give around 10% of the expected fare in both Short and Long distance treatments. In
the Reputation treatment, we observe only 45% of drivers giving out a business card
when asked, and although giving is increased slightly on average, reputational concerns
have no significant effect on their other–regarding behaviour.
Differential treatment of testers, conditional on both their own and the drivers’ eth-
nicity, is also observed: white and South–Asian drivers give significantly less, and are
significantly less likely to complete a journey when the tester is black. This result is
robust to a comprehensive range of field, journey, driver and tester specific variations
obtained from each individual journey. Tester specific characteristics are obtained from
a complementary laboratory experiment, following the procedure of Xiao & Houser
(2005). We elicit the perceived aggressiveness, attractiveness, friendliness, trustworthi-
ness and wealthiness of the testers’ appearance, traits that are otherwise ‘unobservable’,
but may vary with ethnicity (Heckman, 1998). To link our results to behaviourial the-
ory, we also conduct a structural analysis in order to obtain other–regarding preference
parameter estimates. Estimates from a range of models reveal that the other–regarding
preferences of drivers are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained from
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laboratory experiments, and that these preferences are group–contingent.
In the Reputation treatment we find that reputational concerns can increase the
drivers’ other–regard, but only when drivers are carrying a white tester. Black testers
see no significant increases, and we observe decreases in giving for South–Asian testers
stemming from reputational concerns. The differential effect of reputation is attributed
to the drivers’ beliefs being influenced by the passengers’ ethnicity, either their belief
about the probability of a repeated interaction, or their belief regarding the payoff they
will receive from the future interaction. This is discussed further in Section 4.5.
This study makes a number of contributions. First, we contribute to the debate
on the generalisability of laboratory experiments by providing evidence that other–
regarding preferences can appear in transactions observed a natural competitive market
setting with a similar prominence to that observed in the laboratory. Our findings are
in contrast to the evidence from the field study of List (2006), but also that of Stoop
et al. (2012) and Winking & Mizer (2013), although in line with the findings of Stoop
(2014). Second, we find evidence that the effects of reputational concerns on behaviour
are not as strong as theory might predict. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that
discrimination can manifest itself within beliefs as well as other–regarding preferences,
in line with recent behavioural theories (Chen & Li, 2009; Chen & Chen, 2011).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the relevant
literature, Section 4.3 discusses the taxi markets we study and Section 4.4 outlines the
experimental design in detail. Section 4.5 outlines reduced form estimation results, and
estimates from a structural model. Section 4.6 examines the robustness of our results by
accounting for potential multiple hypothesis testing. Section 4.7 discusses alternative
interpretations of the results and Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Literature
4.2.1 Other–regarding preferences
As highlighted in the reviews of Camerer & Fehr (2004) and Cooper & Kagel (2009),
other–regarding preferences are well established to exist in the laboratory. However, it
is typically assumed that social preferences are irrelevant in market settings (Schmidt,
2011) and, as reported by DellaVigna (2009), there is little field evidence to support
many of the laboratory derived conclusions. Levitt & List (2007) provide a range of
reasons for why these conclusions may fail to generalise to field settings. In addition,
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pro–social behaviour in the field is often difficult to attribute to inherent preferences,
as it is easily attributed to reputational concerns and social pressure effects (Akerlof &
Kranton, 2000).2
Laboratory experiments have typically focused on dictator games, ultimatum games
and public goods games in order to measure social and other–regarding preferences.
However, individuals determined to have such preferences are often observed to be-
have selfishly under different institutions; competitive settings appear to ‘crowd out’
other–regarding behaviour. For example, it is well established that individuals reject
unfair offers in ultimatum games, suggesting that subjects are inequality averse (Fehr
& Schmidt, 1999). Yet, many experimental markets converge on the competitive equi-
librium.3 Whilst some suggest this result is indicative that individuals do not have
these preferences, the models of Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000)
predict this outcome. This behaviour could be explained by individuals being unable to
enforce an equitable outcome within a market setting, and so they make the best of a
bad situation (Camerer & Fehr, 2006). Dufwenberg et al. (2011) show this theoretically
in a general equilibrium framework: under certain conditions, the market behaviour of
agents with other–regarding preferences cannot be distinguished from those with stan-
dard preferences.4
A serious criticism raised against measuring other–regarding preferences in the lab is
the influence of experimenter scrutiny on the behaviour of subjects (Levitt & List, 2007).
As highlighted by Zizzo (2010), the obtrusiveness of the laboratory may encourage
subjects to behave how they believe the experimenter wants them to, or how they
should, rather than how they would otherwise. In support of this argument, Hoffman
et al. (1996) show how increasing the level of anonymity granted to subjects, by moving
to a ‘double blind’ procedure in the dictator game, drastically reduces the amount of
giving. Haley & Fessler (2005) find that a pair of eyes on the screen drastically increases
giving. Similar findings have been reported in bargaining games (Hoffman et al., 1994).
From the field, Winking & Mizer (2013) analyse the dictator game in a natural field
experiment in Las Vegas, giving strangers at a bus stop $10 worth of casino chips,
and suggesting they share them with another stranger. When the stranger is aware
they are being scrutinised by an experimenter, they behave in line with the laboratory
2There is a rich literature examining the robustness of reciprocity and gift–exchange in the field,
e.g. Gneezy & List (2006) and Falk (2007).
3See Roth et al. (1991) as an example.
4Schmidt (2011) provides an excellent review of this literature.
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predictions, but when they are unaware they behave perfectly selfishly. Scrutiny appears
to encourage pro–social behaviour.
However, there is considerable evidence against this criticism. For example, in
contrast to Hoffman et al. (1996), Koch & Normann (2008) do not observe decreased
giving as the level of anonymity is increased and Bolton et al. (1998) cast doubt on the
bargainning results of Hoffman et al. (1994). In addition, there is increasing evidence of
correlations between laboratory and field behaviour. Benz & Meier (2008) analyse how
charitable giving behaviour correlates between the lab and the field, and find reasonably
high correlations between behaviours two years apart. In contrast to Winking & Mizer
(2013), Stoop (2014) finds strong evidence of dictator giving in a natural context, and
finds that varying the level of scrutiny the subjects are under has no effect on giving
rates. Our experiment adds to this literature by measuring other–regarding preferences
with no experimenter or third–party scrutiny.
There is also evidence that the decision variable through which individuals express
pro–social behaviours can influence their decisions. A seminal study by Stoop et al.
(2012) studies the behaviour of fishermen in a social dilemma game. They build a
bridge between the laboratory and the field, first analysing behaviour in the laboratory
in a standard VCM (voluntary contribution mechanism) game, then behaviour at the
bank of a fishing pond in the same game, and finally in a framed field experiment where
they induce a VCM game through actual fishing. Although the fisherman behave highly
other–regarding in the laboratory and at the bank of the pond, once the task is changed
to fishing, no cooperation is observed. A real task reduces cooperation in comparison
to a virtual one. Our study makes a similar contribution, as we analyse behaviour from
a real task directly associated with a particular job.
In the field, DellaVigna et al. (2012) use a novel natural field experiment, nested
within a charitable door–to–door fund raiser, in order to disentangle altruism from
social pressure effects. The experiment gives potential donors the option to opt–out of
meeting a fund raiser, allowing those who might give as a consequence of social pressure
to select out. Although they find that a significant number of individuals give out of
pure preference to do so, social pressure is found to increase giving substantially. There
is also evidence to suggest social pressure influences voter turn–out (Gerber et al., 2008),
and causes workers to partially internalise the negative externalities of free riding; Mas
& Moretti (2009) find that worker effort is positively related to the productivity of
workers who observe them, but also with those they expect to interact with again.
List (2006) considers the behaviour of local and non–local sports card dealers, where
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the former have reputational concerns whilst the latter do not. List finds that the lo-
cals exhibit gift–exchange, but the non–locals do not, interpreting this as gift–exchange
driven by reputational concerns, although alternative interpretations of the data have
been proposed by Camerer (2015), and subsequently critiqued by Al-Ubaydli & List
(2015). Other studies find reputational concerns to have a minimal impact on be-
haviour. In a field experiment, Schneider (2012) finds that car mechanics are only in-
fluenced by the prospect of repeated interactions in certain transactions. An important
conclusion, is that the predicted effect of reputation on behaviour depends heavily on
the assumptions of the model being used to predict the outcome. In the lab, Grosskopf
& Sarin (2010) find that when reputational concerns and social preferences are at odds
(Ely & Valimaki, 2003), the latter is likely to surpass the former. The authors report
strong evidence that, even when faced with reputational concerns, individuals take
others’ interests into account. As a result, they show that the effects of reputation on
behaviour are not as large as theory predicts. They further provide evidence against the
implicit argument of List (2006): that reputation and social preferences are substitutes.
4.2.2 Discrimination
Within economics, both laboratory and field experiments have been used to examine
the role that ethnic and gender identities play in shaping behaviour. Laboratory ex-
periments can be divided into those studying natural identities, such as race, gender
and ethnicity, and those examining induced group identities using variations of the
minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). Framed field experiments are similar in
design to laboratory studies, whilst natural field experiments are typically either audit
or correspondence studies.
Laboratory studies have considered the implications of natural identities for be-
haviour in a number of social dilemmas. In dictator games ethnicity (Whitt & Wilson,
2007), race (van Der Mewe & Burns, 2008), political views (Fowler & Kam, 2007) and
Jewish identity (Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001) have all been shown to produce favouritism
towards a particular social group. In prisoners’ dilemma games, cooperation rates are
increased when kibbutz members play with each other (Ruﬄe & Sosis, 2006) and when
members of the same randomly assigned platoon play together (Goette et al., 2006).
Further, members of minority ethnic groups display greater cooperation rates towards
each other than those of ethnic majorities do towards each other (Cox et al., 1991).
However, it is often unclear why these identities affect behaviour in these ways. This
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is largely due to the complex, and often ambiguous ways in which identities interact,
making it difficult to distinguish between taste based discrimination (Becker, 1971) and
statistical discrimination.
In order to try and understand discriminatory behaviour in the absence of stereo-
types and beliefs that may otherwise affect behaviour, laboratory experimenters have
turned to study artificially induced identities by using minimal (Tajfel et al., 1971),
near–minimal and enhanced group paradigms (Chen & Chen, 2011). Through inducing
an artificial identity in the lab, the experimenter can control the identity that guides
behaviour, thus removing the ambiguities and complexities that arise from studying
natural identities. Evidence from these paradigms suggests that other–regarding and
pro–social behaviours are larger when individuals interact with those they identify with
(the ‘in–group’). They behave more charitably in dictator games and more reciprocally
in trust games (Chen & Li, 2009). Common identities result in leaders contributing
more in sequential public goods games (Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2013), and pairs to coor-
dinate more efficiently in minimum effort games (Chen & Chen, 2011). The prevailing
explanation for these effects, which has recently been criticised (Zizzo, 2012; Guala &
Filippin, 2015), is that social preferences are group–contingent (Chen & Li, 2009), or
that an individual’s other–regard is conditional on how they identify with the person
they are interacting with.
A common type of field experiment designed to analyse discrimination in labour
markets are correspondence studies, in which the experimenter fabricates a large num-
ber of identical CVs whilst varying either the ethnicity, nationality or gender of the
applicant through the use of names, or photos. In a seminal study into discrimination
conducted in the US, Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004) examine the extent to which
employers treat applications with stereotypically black names differently to those with
stereotypically white names in job call back decisions. Applications with white names
receive 50% more call backs than those with black names. Similar findings have been
reported in Australia, across multiple minority ethnic groups (Booth et al., 2012), and
in Canada across multiple occupations (Oreopoulos, 2011). Such studies come close to
identifying a ‘taste’ for discrimination, although statistical discrimination can often not
be ruled out.
Those studies which are most related to ours, audit studies, utilise actors to take
part in standardised interactions such as job interviews.5 These studies have typically
5See Riach & Rich (2002) for a survey of audit studies.
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used ‘pairs’ of people matched on observable characteristics, with the implicit assump-
tion that they differ only by, for example, ethnicity or gender. The most prominent
audit studies report evidence of statistical discrimination. List (2004) finds evidence
that sports card sellers charge buyers from minority ethnic groups more for the same
card than white buyers. However, this is attributed to those minority buyers having
higher reservation values, rather than being the result of taste based discrimination.
Gneezy et al. (2012) conduct a series of experiments designed to parse taste based and
statistical discrimination. Although the majority of evidence points towards statistical
discrimination, weak evidence in favour of the taste based explanation is found in the
treatment of homosexuals. They conclude that further study is required.
A number of audit studies of taxis report statistical discrimination by drivers, along
both ethnic and gender lines. Castillo et al. (2013) find evidence that male taxi drivers
in Peru discriminate in favour of women by agreeing to lower fares when bargaining over
identical journeys. Similar to the findings of List (2004), this is attributed to men having
higher reservation values than women. Further evidence from Balafoutas et al. (2013)
suggests that drivers in Athens, Greece, take non–locals on a longer, and therefore
more expensive route, than locals for journeys to the same destination. Although this
appears to be the result of taste based discrimination against foreigners, such behaviour
is consistent with drivers exploiting informational asymmetries between passengers, as
non–locals are unlikely to be familiar with the average fare of a particular journey.
Using observational data, Jackson & Schneider (2011) detail how New York City taxi
drivers who lease a car from a member of their country–of–birth exhibit reduced effects
of moral hazard. They argue that such a result is consistent with the presence of
increased social sanctions in the form of community–enforced punishments, rather than
being a consequence of social preferences.
Whilst not a study of taxis, the study closest to ours is that of Mujcic & Fri-
jters (2013). Exploiting a natural interaction between bus drivers and passengers, paid
testers acting as passengers attempted to board buses without any money. They find
that white testers are allowed to embark 72% of the time, Indians 51% and blacks just
36% of the time. This result remains robust to a wide range of controls, including
tester characteristics, such as aggression, attractiveness, and others, elicited through
a post–experimental survey. These controls, which are neither elicited in an incentive
compatible nor in an anonymous manner, are included in an attempt to control for the
‘Heckman criticism’ (Heckman, 1998): implicit in the assumptions of all audit studies is
that unobservable characteristics of confederates are identical across gender or ethnicity.
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The interaction can be viewed as an other–other allocation game (Tajfel et al., 1971;
Turner, 1978), where the driver must allocate resources between the passenger and the
bus company, rather than being comparable to the dictator game. As drivers are not
monitored, their choices, while costly to the bus company, are financially costless to
them. Our study distinguishes itself from Mujcic & Frijters (2013) as we consider dis-
crimination in a situation where pro–social behaviour is costly to the person exhibiting
it.
As highlighted by Heckman (1998), a common misconception is that tastes for dis-
crimination will disappear from markets in the long run. However, this is only the case
under certain market conditions. The example that Heckman gives is of entrepreneurs
and their hiring decisions: if entrepreneurs have a taste for white employees over those
that are black, they can indulge this taste as long as they gain income. Only if the
supply of entrepreneurship is perfectly elastic in the long run at a zero price, so that
entrepreneurs have no income with which to indulge their tastes, will taste based dis-
crimination disappear.
4.3 The market for taxi services
In the United Kingdom, there are two types of vehicles that operate as taxis: private
hire vehicles (PHVs) and Hackney carriages. PHVs are not as strictly regulated as the
latter, and anyone who has a driving license and is willing to pay the licensing fee, in
practice, is able to become a PHV driver. PHVs are unable to ply for hire and must be
pre-booked over the phone: passengers must actively select a company or driver for a
given journey. The price of the journey (or fare) is independently set by each firm, or
negotiated ex-ante, and vehicles often don’t have a fitted meter. As such, PHV fares
can vary wildly, as can the types of vehicles used.
In contrast, Hackney carriages are taxis in the true sense: drivers can ply for hire,
with customers able to hail or call them, and drivers are able to wait at designated taxi
ranks to be approached by customers. Drivers and passengers are randomly matched,
and importantly, customers are unable to select their driver. When hailing a vehicle, a
customer must take whichever driver happens to be in the area. At a rank, customers
must take the taxi at the front of the queue, and drivers further down the queue will
refuse journeys from customers who approach them. The only real possibility of using
the same driver repeatedly is by obtaining his personal contact details.
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Greater Manchester
Birmingham Manchester Trafford Salford
Initial Charge £2.20 £2.30 £2.00 £2.40
(187 yards) (404 yards) (815 yards) (480 yards)
Mileage Charge 20p per 20p per 20p per 22p per
125 yards 190 yards 164 yards 240 yards
to 1062 yards
Thereafter 20p per - - -
195 yards
Wait Time Charge 20p per 20p per 28p per 20p per
45 seconds 39 seconds 60 seconds 90 seconds
Cost of 1.8 Mile
£5.44 £5.26 £4.87 £4.86
Journey
Cost of 4.4 Mile
£10.12 £10.16 £10.61 £9.17
Journey
Wait Time Rate
£16.00 £18.46 £16.80 £8.00
(per hour)
Source: Fare information is taken from Birmingham, Manchester, Trafford
and Salford Council 2015 taxi fare tables obtained through correspondence
with the respective licensing authorities. Manchester, Trafford and Salford
are boroughs within the Greater Manchester area. All calculations based on a
journey made by a single passenger with no luggage, between 9am and 5pm.
Table 4.1: Taxi Fares by Local Authority
The strict regulation of Hackney carriages ensures their similarity, with all drivers
having to pass a road knowledge and English language test. All vehicles have to adhere
to strict standards, such as being fitted with safety screens to separate the driver and
passenger, having wheel chair access and the vehicle being under a certain age.6 All
vehicles are fitted with a taxi meter which displays the cost of the journey, up to a
given point, to the passenger. The meter starts from a fixed amount and increases by
a set amount every so many yards driven, or seconds waiting in traffic. Metered fares
are set by the local authority. Those relevant for this study are detailed in Table 4.1.
Important to our study is the fact that the metered fare is the maximum fare the
driver is able to charge the passenger unless a different fare was negotiated prior to
the passenger entering the taxi. If no ex-ante negotiation took place, the metered
fare is the amount the passenger must pay by law. Where no negotiation took place,
fare reductions are made entirely at the driver’s discretion and the driver is within his
rights to refuse any reductions the passenger asks for. The 2014 Birmingham Unmet
Taxi Demand Survey indicates that the vast majority of Hackney carriages (90%) are
6This is the case in the cities that we study, but varies throughout the UK.
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Greater Manchester
Local Authority Birmingham Manchester Trafford
Number of Taxis 1,255 1,086 143
Number of Ranks 19 49 18
Top five taxi ranks, ordered by weekly passenger numbers:
1 13,611 19,109 2,447
2 4,102 5,953 2,309
3 2,686 4,312 1,743
4 2,457 3,750 833
5 2,093 3,189 530
Total Per Week: 45,778 56,830 9,033
Source: The number of operating Hackney carriages is taken
from the Birmingham (2014), Manchester (2012) and Trafford
(2015) Unmet Taxi Demand Surveys and from correspon-
dence with the licensing authorities of the respective coun-
cils. No information was made available by Salford Council,
except that there are 111 operating taxis. The figures pre-
sented here exclude hailed and pre–booked journeys.
Table 4.2: Taxis, Taxi Ranks and Weekly Passenger Numbers
driver owned: drivers keep all the fare, any tips (which are typically around 10%), and
incur all the costs associated with a journey.7 The cost of a discretionary fare reduction
is therefore borne exclusively by the driver.
The markets we study are incredibly thick, with tens of thousands of journeys taken
each week, with over a thousand licensed Hackney carriages operating in each city. As
outlined in Table 4.2, some of the taxi ranks see over 19,000 passengers per week. The
sheer number of transactions, large number of taxi ranks and the ability of drivers to
‘cruise’ streets plying for hire, means an infrequent user of Hackney carriages is highly
unlikely to have a repeated interaction with the same driver, and the driver they do
interact with is essentially randomly assigned.
4.4 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment was designed to measure other-regarding preferences of Hackney car-
riage drivers (herein taxi drivers) in actual market transactions, and determine the
extent to which these preferences vary with their own and the passenger’s ethnicity.
It was also designed to examine if reputational concerns can explain other-regarding
7Many drivers are, however, affiliated with a firm from which they can take private hire bookings.
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behaviour. We use a natural field experiment that allows us to observe behaviour in a
market setting, in a natural interaction devoid of experimenter scrutiny. Our subjects,
the taxi drivers, were oblivious to a study taking place.
4.4.1 Testers
The testers were hired by placing a job advert looking for ‘Research Assistants’ on
the Universal Jobsmatch website, a national website initiated by the UK government’s
Department for Work and Pensions which anyone can use to advertise a job. The advert
stated that individuals were required to assist in conducting some ‘economic research’.
Although the specific job role wasn’t stated, it was advertised that some walking in and
around the city centre would be required. Everyone who applied was invited to attend
a briefing and training session at a neutral location, where they were told about the job
role and asked to sign consent forms in order to take part. The rate of pay was £8.30
per hour (all experimental materials are given in Appendix C.1).
Briefing sessions lasted between 1 and 2 hours and a single treatment was discussed
in detail. Testers were given copies of one script they were required to follow, and the
experimental sheet they would have to complete.8 They were told the script may vary,
and that they would be given a chance to practice any variants before completing the
task. Testers were told explicitly to follow the script as closely as possible, and when
interacting with the drivers they were told they must not attempt to influence any of
their decisions. Testers were told not to engage in conversation with the drivers, and
scripted responses were given to anticipated questions. Our hypotheses and predictions
regarding the study were never made clear to the testers, and not all the testers met
each other, reducing the opportunity for testers to guess the study might involve their
own ethnicity.9 All testers wore casual clothing.
Each tester also consented to have their face photographed for ‘research purposes’.
Once the experiment was complete, we had their appearance rated by subjects in a
follow–up laboratory experiment. Subjects in the lab had to rate the pictures for
aggressiveness, attractiveness, friendliness, trustworthiness and wealthiness, on a scale
from 1 to 10 (with 1 being ‘Not very ’ and 10 being ‘Very ’). This was done to control
for otherwise unobservable characteristics that may vary with the testers’ ethnicity
8We discussed the Short distance / No Reputation treatment, which is described in Section 4.4.2.
9Once the study was completed, all the testers were asked to guess what they thought the study
was about. None correctly identified the research questions.
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(Heckman, 1998). These 5 characteristics were chosen for a number of reasons. First,
the importance of an individual’s attractiveness in fostering the helping behaviours of
others has been outlined in a wealth of studies, with the most attractive typically found
to be treated most generously (Benson et al., 1976). Attractiveness has also been shown
to be successful in promoting others’ other-regarding behaviours (Landry et al., 2006)
and is correlated with labour market outcomes (Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006). Secondly,
historical and recent evidence suggests that faces that appear aggressive and unfriendly,
or threatening, may stimulate a different thought system in comparison to one seen as
non-threatening. For example, O¨hman (1986) argues that threatening faces activate
the ‘fear system’ and therefore provide a powerful stimuli. If this is the case, faces
displaying differing levels of aggression and friendliness may trigger different types of
behaviours, such as self-defensive compared to helping behaviours (see Schupp et al.
(2004) for evidence, and a discussion of the literature). Thirdly, any differential in
giving stemming from ethnicity may be related to status differences relating to wealth,
similar to that shown by Mitra & Ray (2014). Finally, as the interaction between a
driver and tester may rely on the driver trusting the passenger regarding how much
money they have, we also elicit the passengers’ facial appearance of trustworthiness.
To obtain the ratings, each laboratory subject was shown a random set of 11 photos
and asked to rate their appearance. Following Xiao & Houser (2005), to increase sub-
jects’ attentiveness to the task they were told that one photo, and one characteristic
of that photo, would be selected at random, and if their decision for that photo and
that characteristics was in line with the ratings of the majority of the other subjects in
the session, they would receive £2. It took subjects around 10 minutes to rate all the
photos required of them. A sample of 1188 ratings was obtained from 108 laboratory
subjects. The ratings are presented in Table 4.3.10,11
We find that black testers are rated significantly less attractive, trustworthy, friendly
and wealthy than both white and South–Asian testers (p < 0.001 in all cases, Robust
Rank Order Tests). Black testers are also rated the most aggressive (p < 0.001 in
both cases, Robust Rank Order Tests). Interestingly, white testers are rated as less
attractive, trustworthy, friendly and wealthy than South–Asian testers (p = 0.06 for
attractiveness, p < 0.001 in all other cases, Robust Rank Order Tests). White testers
are also seen as more aggressive than the South–Asian testers (p < 0.001, Robust Rank
10Table C.1, in Appendix C.2, presents the correlations between the Testers’ perceived facial ap-
pearance characteristics.
11The photo ratings sessions were conducted at the end of other, unrelated experimental sessions.
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Tester Ethnicity
All testers White Black S.–Asian
Age 27.6 29.5 26.14 24
(8.25) (10.18) (5.64) (4.58)
Gender (1 if male) 0.68 0.58 0.86 0.67
(0.477) (0.52) (0.378) (0.58)
Aggressiveness 4.02 3.98 4.61 2.86
(2.28) (2.30) (2.32) (1.61)
Attractiveness 4.73 4.81 4.43 5.16
(2.08) (2.15) (2.01) (1.86)
Friendliness 5.92 5.86 5.52 7.07
(2.25) (2.24) (2.27) (1.85)
Trustworthiness 5.68 5.69 5.19 6.76
(2.15) (2.13) (2.17) (1.74)
Wealthiness♦ 5.27 5.46 4.56 6.21
(1.85) (1.90) (1.65) (1.46)
No. of Ratings 1188 638 383 167
No. of Testers 22 12 7 3
Note: Testers’ age and ethnicity is self-reported. Correlations
between appearance characteristics are presented in Table C.1
in Appendix C.2. The raters’ ethnicities are presented in Fig-
ure C.1 in Appendix C.2.
♦ Wealthiness ratings were obtained from 60 laboratory sub-
jects, with the following total ratings: 660 across all testers,
360 for white, 210 for black, and 90 for South–Asian testers.
Table 4.3: Tester Characteristics
Order Test). We control for these tester specific variations in our parametric analysis
in Section 4.5.
We focus on facial appearance due to the way that the driver and tester interact
whilst in the taxi. As outlined in Section 4.4.2, the driver’s decision to behave other–
regarding is made whilst he is driving, and so he is likely to view the tester briefly,
either through his rear-view mirror, or by looking over his shoulder. Visual emphasis
will be placed on the tester’s face, rather than other physical traits such as their BMI,
height or build.
4.4.2 Procedure
On a given day, a tester was blindly and randomly assigned to a treatment and was
required to complete between 3 to 10 journeys. As the journeys were taken from ranks,
the tester had to approach the taxi at the front of the rank, enter the taxi and then
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Short Distance Long Distance
No Reputation
Entry Script “I don’t take taxis very often.”
Endowment £4 £8
Expected Fare £5 £10
Reputation
Entry Script
“I’m looking for a reliable driver for future
journeys. Can I have a business card?”
Endowment £4 £8
Expected Fare £5 £10
Note: The expected fare of journeys in each treatment is approximate.
Table 4.4: Experimental Design Summary
state their destination. The experiment first varies the distance of the journeys in
Short and Long distance treatments, with journey lengths of approximately 1.7 miles
and 4.4 miles, which had expected fares of approximately £5 and £10. The testers were
endowed with either £4 or £8 for each journey, depending on its distance. Journeys
were taken in either Birmingham or the Greater Manchester area, with those starting
in Birmingham taken over 5 days, and those in Manchester over 3. All journeys were
taken between 11am and 5pm and at least 4 testers were in the field at any given time,
along with an experimenter.
Upon entering the taxi, the tester first stated their destination, and then spoke a
simple entry statement.12 In the No Reputation treatment they stated, “I don’t take
taxis very often”, and in the Reputation treatment they stated, “I’m looking for a
reliable driver for future journeys. Can I have a business card?”. The first statement
signals to the driver that the interaction is one-shot, as a passenger who doesn’t take
taxis very often is unlikely to meet the same driver twice. The second statement is
designed to signal that a repeated interaction is possible, that the drivers’ behaviour
may influence the probability of a future interaction, and may affect the payoffs from a
future interaction.13 The scripts were designed to be kept simple in order to keep them
standardised and to avoid actor bias (Heckman, 1998), but also to keep them natural
and believable to the drivers. This design feature clearly contrasts with laboratory
experiments, where interactions are designed to be ‘sterile’ and, predominantly, without
context.
Once the taxi journey began, the testers were required to wait in silence until the
12The first ride taken by each tester was discreetly observed by the experimenter, to ensure they
entered the taxi correctly.
13For example, by affecting the amount the passenger tips.
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meter reached a certain amount: £3 in Short, and £6 in Long distance journeys, or
60% of the expected fare. Once the meter reached this amount, testers spoke the
following endowment statement: “I’m sorry, I only have £x! Can you still take me to
my destination for that amount?”, where x = £4 in Short, and x = £8 in Long distance
journeys. By revealing this to the driver once the meter reached 60% of the expected
fare, the driver was given ample time to stop the taxi. It also signalled the testers’
intention to pay the amount that they could afford, removing any belief the driver may
have that the passenger won’t pay. Table 4.4 summarises the experimental design.
Driver Characteristics
Driver Ethnicity
All Drivers White Black South–Asian Other
Age 44.3 50.06 40.36 42.6 41.3
(10.67) (10.56) (9.36) (10.03) (11.45)
Gender (1 if male) 0.99 0.97 1 0.99 1
(0.12) (0.17) (0) (0.07) (0)
Journeys 283 71 11 191 10
Field Characteristics
Mean
Traffic (1 if Not Busy, 10 Very Busy) 4.44
(2.26)




Conversation (1 if driver attempted a conversation) 0.28
(0.45)
Cashpoint (1 if driver offered a cashpoint) 0.04
(0.2)
Business card, Reputation only (1 if one was given) 0.45
(0.5)
Receipt Given (1 if given) 0.9
(0.308)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Where the driver’s ethnicity is classified as
‘Other’, the tester either did not complete the experimental sheet, or classified them
outside the 3 main ethnic groups that are specified.
Table 4.5: Variables Recorded by the Testers
We refer to the driver continuing the journey past the amount that the tester can
afford as giving, or as the driver expressing his other–regarding preferences, which is
accurately measured by the meter. Once the driver decided how much to give, and where
to end the journey, the tester had to ask for a receipt, leave the taxi, and discreetly
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complete an experimental sheet. The sheet included subjective characteristics of the
driver, such as his age, gender (1 if male) and ethnicity, measures of the field including
traffic intensity (recorded on a 10 point scale: 1 if Not Busy, 10 if Very Busy) and
the weather (1 if raining), and finally characteristics of the ride including whether the
driver attempted a conversation (1 if yes), if he offered a cashpoint (1 if yes) and (in
the Reputation treatment) if he gave a business card or not (1 if one was given). Most
importantly, the testers had to record the final meter reading and if the driver completed
the journey or not.14 We present these measures in Table 4.5.
At this stage, it is worth pointing out what the experimental procedure was not.
The procedure was not an attempt to obtain free journeys by demanding them from
the driver, nor did the testers manoeuvre the driver into making a decision he did
not want to take. The testers were instructed to respect the driver at all times, and
at no point did the testers question the drivers’ right to charge the metered fare. As
the tester requests the reduction of the fare, the driver clearly possesses the right to
grant or refuse the request and charge the metered amount: the interaction cannot be
interpreted as a negotiation.
4.5 Results
In this section, we outline the experimental results. A number of common features are
present throughout the analysis. Where non-parametric tests are utilised, both the p–
value and test statistic are presented in parentheses. Unless otherwise stated, all tests
are two–sided, and in all regressions journeys from all treatments are pooled.
4.5.1 Journey calibration checks
Some initial calibration checks are conducted in order to examine if our expected fare
calculations are accurate. Table 4.6 outlines the recorded fare, expected fare and
amounts given as a percentage of the expected fare, from journeys where the driver
completed the journey. Observations are disaggregated by Short and Long distance
journeys. By comparing the observed fare in a completed journey to its expected fare,
the accuracy of our expected fare calculations can be examined. Minor discrepancies
14This cannot be inferred from the receipts, which only contain information about the amount paid
by the tester.
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between recorded and expected fares are to be expected, largely due to variations in
traffic intensity and other random shocks.
Formally comparing the recorded and expected fares, no significant differences in the
Short distance treatment (p = 0.652, Sign Test) or Long distance treatment (p = 0.524,
Sign Test) are reported. The amount given as a percentage of the expected fare is not
significantly different to the planned 20% in both the Short (p = 1, Sign Test) and
Long (p = 1, Sign Test) distance treatments. We conclude that our journey planning
is accurate.
Short Distance Long Distance
Recorded Fare (£) £5.44 £10.42
(1.29) (1.465)
Expected Fare (£) £5.40 £10.02
(1.07) (0.781)
Amount Given as a % of the expected fare 27.5% 24.1%
(0.254) (0.148)
Completed Journeys 44 22
Note: We exclude from these calculations 18 observations where the driver
completed the journey, but switched off the meter before the journey was com-
pleted. In these 18 cases, we approximate the meter reading by the expected
fare. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 4.6: Fares, Expected Fares and Average Giving conditional
on the Driver Completing the Journey
4.5.2 Other regard and reputation effects
Table 4.7 outlines average amounts given by drivers and the proportion of journeys they
completed, by treatment. To examine if relative payoffs are a motivating factor behind
the amounts that drivers are giving, giving as a percentage of the expected fare is also
reported. Figure 4.1 displays the distribution of giving across treatments.
Table 4.8 reports a number of random effects Tobit regressions. In models (1), (2)
and (3) giving in pounds by driver i to tester j is the dependent variable. In models
(4), (5) and (6), giving as a percentage of the expected fare by driver i to tester j is
the dependent variable. Considering giving in this way enables us to control for the
variation in journey lengths, and therefore variation in the expected fares of journeys,
both within and between treatments. In each regression, dummy variables for the
Long distance treatment and the Reputation treatment are included along with their
interaction; the Short distance No Reputation treatment is taken as the baseline.
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(a) Short Distance Journeys


























(b) Long Distance Journeys
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Giving, by Treatment
No Reputation Reputation
Short Long Short Long
Amount Given (£) £0.56 £1.11 £0.71 £1.07
(0.69) (1.39) (1.06) (1.21)
Amount Given as a % of the Expected Fare 10.6% 11.2% 13.4% 10.5%
(0.128) (0.144) (0.207) (0.12)
Proportion of Journeys Completed 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.34
Number of Journeys 95 48 93 47
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 4.7: Average Driver Giving, by Treatment
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Random Effects Tobit Regressions
Dep. Variable: Amount Given (£) Amount Given as a
% of the Exp. Fare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long 0.536** 0.63** 0.609** -0.005 0.016 -0.002
(0.217) (0.248) (0.245) (0.062) (0.071) (0.07)
Rep. 0.097 0.074 0.091 0.039 0.035 0.04
(0.154) (0.156) (0.154) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
Rep. × Long 0.01 0.041 0.025 0.011 0.021 0.017
(0.272) (0.276) (0.271) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078)
Constant 0.68*** 0.82*** 0.667** 0.178*** 0.181*** 0.142**
(0.203) (0.267) (0.273) (0.049) (0.068) (0.066)
City Controls X X X X X X
Field Controls X X X X
Ride Controls X X
Observations 283 282 281 283 282 281
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The number of observations fall slightly as more
controls are included due to missing entries. Models (1), (2) and (3) are left
censored at 0, and right censored at the difference between the expected fare
had the driver completed the journey, and the amount paid by the tester.
Models (4), (5) and (6) are left censored at 0, and right censored at 1.
Table 4.8: Treatment Effects
In each subsequent model, the number of explanatory variables is increased to ex-
amine the robustness of the estimated treatment effects. The additional variables we
use were those recorded by the testers, outlined in Table 4.5, which we group into 3
distinct sets: Field, City and Ride controls. The set of Field Controls includes the
variable for traffic intensity (recorded on a 10 point scale: 1 if Not Busy, 10 if Very
Busy), and a dummy controlling for the weather conditions (1 if raining). City Controls
includes dummies for the journey taken in Birmingham, Trafford or Salford (1 if yes),
with those taken in Manchester taken as the baseline. Ride Controls includes dummies
controlling for whether the driver offered to take the passenger to a cash–point (1 if
offered) and if he tried to engage in a conversation (1 if yes).
Result 1. The majority of taxi drivers give at least part of the journey for free.
Support. Considering journeys from the No Reputation treatment, the null hypothe-
sis of no giving can be rejected at the 1% level in both Long and Short distance journeys
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(p < 0.01, both cases, Sign Test). Over 70% of drivers give part of the journey for free,
and over 25% of all journeys were completed in full. Parametric support is given in
Table 4.8, with a positive and significant constant in all regression models (p < 0.05,
in all cases). Similar findings are observed in the Reputation treatment, with over 75%
of drivers giving at least part of the journey for free, and 32% of all journeys being
completed in full.
Result 2. Driver giving is proportional to the distance of the journey.
Support. Examining journeys from the No Reputation treatment, average driver
giving is significantly different in Short distance journeys in comparison to Long dis-
tance journeys (p = 0.056, Robust Rank Order Test). This is shown graphically in
Figure 4.2a. The distribution of giving is also found to vary by the distance of the jour-
ney (p = 0.039, Kruskal–Wallis Test). Table 4.8, regressions (1), (2) and (3) support
these conclusions, reporting significant and positive coefficient estimates on the Long
distance dummy (p < 0.05), whilst the coefficient on the Reputation dummy alone is
not significant (p > 0.1). However, when giving as a percentage of the expected fare is
considered, no significant differences are reported by distance (p = 0.86, Robust Rank
Order Test) (see Figure 4.2b). Further, the distance of the journey has no significant
effect on its distribution (p = 0.86, Kruskal–Wallis Test). Estimates from Table 4.8
models (4), (5) and (6), support this conclusion; no significant treatment effects are
reported when the dependent variable is giving as a percentage of the expected fare
(p > 0.1 in all cases, in all regressions), suggesting giving is proportional to the length
of the journey, and therefore the amount the driver can give.
Results 1 and 2 suggest that taxi drivers have other–regarding preferences that ap-
pear to be well defined over the relative payoff between themselves and the passenger.
These results support the idea that such other–regarding behaviour can, and does, exist
within competitive market settings. The effect of other–regarding preferences on the
market is clear: the drivers’ other–regarding preferences lower the price of taxi journeys.
Result 3. Reputational concerns do not explain the extent of giving.
Support. Comparing average giving between Reputation and No Reputation treat-
ments, no significant differences are reported in either Short or Long distance journeys
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(a) Average Giving (£)




























(b) Average Giving as a Percentage of the Expected Fare
Note: Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.2: Average Giving
(p = 0.34 and p = 0.67, Robust Rank Order Tests). Similarly, reputational concerns
have no significant impact on the distribution of giving in either Long or Short dis-
tance treatments (p = 0.44 and p = 0.67, Kruskal–Wallis Test). The same is true for
giving as a percentage of the expected fare, with no significant differences found be-
tween Reputation and No Reputation treatments in Short or Long distance journeys, or
when journeys are pooled (p > 0.1 in all cases, Robust Rank Order Tests). Estimates
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from Table 4.8 supports these results, with the coefficient on the Reputation dummy
found to be not significant at conventional levels across regressions (p > 0.1 in all cases).
Result 3 outlines how the drivers’ behaviour is, on average, unaffected by reputa-
tional concerns. However, it is possible that the effect of the Reputation treatment on
the drivers’ behaviour could either promote or diminish other–regard. It may promote
behaviour if the drivers believe their other–regard will increase the probability of being
contacted for future journeys by the passenger, or that their other–regard might be
reciprocated in future journeys through tipping. Alternatively, it may diminish giving
if drivers do not want a repeated interaction with a passenger who asks for a portion
of the fare for free, especially if they suspect the passenger of using this trick in order
to induce drivers to behave in an other–regarding manner.
In addition, the drivers’ behaviour may depend on the appearance characteristics
of the tester. To explore this further we examine driver giving conditional on the
testers’ ethnicity. Summary statistics are given in Table 4.9 and Figure 4.3 displays
the proportion of completed journeys by tester ethnicity graphically. To determine the
effect of the testers’ ethnicity on driver giving, Table 4.10 outlines the results from a
number of random effects Tobit regressions. In each case, giving in pounds by driver i
to tester j is the dependent variable. The estimated coefficients on a dummy controlling
for whether the tester was black (1 if yes), South–Asian (1 if yes) and if they were male
(1 if yes) are reported; white testers are taken as the baseline.
To examine the robustness of the estimated coefficients, in each model we system-
atically increase the number of explanatory variables, which are grouped into 6 sets:
Treatment, Driver, Tester, Ride, Field and City Controls. Treatment controls include
dummies for each of the treatments (1 if Long, and 1 if Reputation) and the interac-
tion, Driver controls include the driver’s age and gender (1 if male). Tester controls
include the tester’s gender (1 if male), which is reported, and also their age. Field,
Ride and City controls are identical to those described for Table 4.8. For each tester,
we also include their average rating for each appearance characteristic: aggressiveness,
attractiveness, friendliness, trustworthiness and wealthiness. The estimated coefficients
on these variables are included in Table 4.10.
Result 4: Drivers give the least to black testers.




Ethnicity Short Long Short Long Total
White
Amount Given (£) £0.60 £1.21 £0.85 £1.2
(0.564) (1.401) (0.725) (1.29)
Amount Given, % of Exp. Fare 11.1% 12.6% 16.3% 12%
(0.107) (0.157) (0.139) (0.129)
Journeys 60 26 49 29 164
Black
Amount Given (£) £0.26 £0.79 £0.57 £1.05
(0.396) (0.991) (1.57) (1.312)
Amount Given, % of Exp. Fare 5.1% 7.6% 11.3% 9.9%
(0.08) (0.09) (0.309) (0.125)
Journeys 26 11 30 11 78
South–Asian
Amount Given (£) £1.23 £1.22 £0.52 £0.54
(1.402) (1.76) (0.654) (0.526)
Amount Given, % of Exp. Fare 22.9% 11.3% 8.2% 5.4%
(0.255) (0.16) (0.115) (0.052)
Journeys 9 11 14 7 41
Total 95 48 93 47 283
Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses.
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics, by Tester Ethnicity.
South–Asian testers in the No–Reputation treatment reveals no significant differences
between white and South–Asian testers in the Short or Long distance treatments p =
0.64 and p = 0.46, Robust Rank Order Tests). However, significant differences between
white and black testers are reported in the Short but not in the Long distance treatment
(p = 0.001 and p = 0.39, Robust Rank Order Tests). Similarly, a significant difference
between South–Asian and black testers is found in the Short but not in the Long
distance treatment (p = 0.06 and p = 0.47, Robust Rank Order Tests). Considering
giving by the amount given as a percentage of the expected fare reveals that both white
and South–Asian testers are given significantly more than black testers (p = 0.005,
p = 0.025, Robust Rank Order Tests), but no differences are found between white and
South–Asian testers (p = 0.31, Robust Rank Order Test). The estimates in Table 4.10
further support the non–parametric results: across all regressions, the coefficient on
the black dummy is negative, highly significant (p < 0.01, Wald Tests), and robust to
changes in the model specification.
The differential treatment of testers by ethnicity remains in the Reputation treat-
ment, with white testers receiving more than black testers in the Short distance treat-
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Random Effects Tobit Regressions
Dep. Variable: Amount Given (£)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -0.645*** -0.634*** -0.612*** -0.585*** -0.695***
(0.197) (0.191) (0.306) (0.187) (0.179)
South–Asian -0.132 -0.261 -0.202 -0.252 -0.006
(0.264) (0.241) (0.202) (0.236) (0.238)
Male -0.334* -0.324* -0.32* -0.419*











Constant 0.491 1.18 1.02 1.34* 1.184
(0.678) (0.752) (0.715) (0.765) (2.65)
Treatment Controls X X X X X
Driver Controls X X X X X
Tester Controls X X X X
Ride Controls X X X
Field Controls X X
City Controls X X
Observations 275 275 274 274 274
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level. The number of observations falls slightly as more controls
are included due to missing entries. All models are left censored at 0, and right
censored at the difference between expected fare, had the driver completed the
journey, and the amount paid by the tester.
Table 4.10: The Determinants of Driver Giving
ment (p < 0.001, Robust Rank Order Test) although no difference is observed between
white and South–Asian testers (p = 0.63, Robust Rank Order Tests). No differences are
reported between black and South–Asian testers in either distance treatment (p > 0.1
in both cases). Comparing giving as a percentage of the expected fare reveals differ-
ences in giving between white and black and white and South–Asian testers (p < 0.001
and p = 0.003, Robust Rank Order Tests), but no difference between black and South–





























Note: Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4.3: Proportion of Journeys Completed, by
Tester Ethnicity
The proportion of completed journeys, by tester ethnicity, is now considered. Table
4.11 reports a number of random effects Probit regressions, where the dependent vari-
able is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the journey was completed. We increase the
number of explanatory variables in each subsequent model, and use the same control
variables as outlined in Table 4.10.
Result 5: Drivers are least likely to complete a journey for a black tester.
Support. Comparing the proportion of journeys that were completed, by tester eth-
nicity, black testers have their journey completed significantly less often than white and
South–Asian testers in the No Reputation treatment (p = 0.045 and p = 0.088, Fisher’s
Exact Test). No significant differences are reported between white and South–Asian
testers (p = 0.793, Fisher’s Exact Test). The results from the random effects Probit
regressions in Table 4.11 outline how the estimated coefficient on the black dummy is
negative and significant (p = 0.05). This estimate is robust to specification changes,
and becomes increasingly significant as more controls are included. Similar to the co-
efficient estimates in Table 4.10, none of the appearance characteristics are significant,
except the appearance of wealthiness (p = 0.06), which has a negative effect: more
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Random Effects Probit Regressions
Dep. Variable: Journey Completed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black -0.500** -0.506** -0.531** -0.517** -0.643**
(0.196) (0.21) (0.213) (0.221) (0.242)
South–Asian -0.309 -0.348 -0.348 -0.414 -0.053
(0.240) (0.244) (0.245) (0.268) (0.321)
Male -0.281 -0.271 -0.258 -0.318











Constant -0.906 -0.06 -0.140 0.288 3.41
(0.760) (0.847) (0.861) (0.909) (3.51)
Treatment Controls X X X X X
Driver Controls X X X X X
Tester Controls X X X X
Ride Controls X X X
Field Controls X X
City Controls X X
Observations 275 275 274 274 274
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Table 4.11: Determinants of Journey Completion
wealthy looking testers are less likely to have a journey completed.
Results 4 and 5 outline how black testers are treated significantly worse than white
and South–Asian testers. As the coefficient on trustworthiness is insignificant, and its
direction the opposite we would expect, statistical discrimination is likely not the ex-
planation. Status is also unlikely to be a factor, as wealthiness has a negative effect
on giving and our black testers are rated as appearing the least wealthy as outlined
in Section 4.4.1. Indeed, the inclusion of the appearance characteristics increases the
magnitude of the coefficient of the black dummy in both the Tobit and Probit regres-
sions. The evidence points towards taste based discrimination.
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Result 6: Reputational concerns increase driver giving when the tester is white,
have no effect when the tester is black and reduce giving when the tester is South–Asian.
Support. White testers are given significantly greater amounts as a percentage of the
expected fare in the Reputation treatment compared to the No Reputation treatment
(p = 0.06, Robust Rank Order Test). They also receive significantly more in absolute
terms as a result of reputation in the Short distance treatment (p = 0.053, Robust Rank
Order Test), although no significant difference is observed in the Long distance treat-
ment (p = 0.61, Robust Rank Order Test). Black testers see no significant differences
as a result of reputation (p > 0.1 in all cases, Robust Rank Order Tests). South–Asian
testers see no effect of reputation on absolute giving in both the Short (p = 0.27, Robust
Rank Order Test) and Long distance treatments (p = 0.5, Robust Rank Order Test),
and a (weakly) negative effect is reported in giving as a percentage of the expected fare
(p = 0.15, Robust Rank Order Test) resulting from driver reputational concerns.
Result 6 can be explained by drivers’ beliefs about their expected payoffs from their
future interaction with the passenger, and is unlikely to be due to beliefs that white
passengers are most able to contact them: drivers give business cards uniformly across
all tester ethnicities (p > 0.1 in all comparisons, Fisher’s Exact Tests). There are,
however, two different belief channels through which the disparity can occur, either
through drivers’ beliefs about the probability of a repeated interaction, or through
their beliefs about their earnings from a repeated interaction. Drivers may believe
the probability of a future interaction is greatest for a white passenger, or that by
expressing other–regard they increase this probability by more than if the tester was
black or South–Asian. Alternatively, drivers may believe white passengers are more
likely to reciprocate their other–regard in a future interaction through tipping, as shown
by Ayres et al. (2005), who report that white passengers in the United States tip
approximately twice as much as passengers of other ethnicities.
4.5.3 Structural models
The reduced form estimates provided in Section 4.5.2 provide evidence of variation in
driver giving that is conditional on the testers ethnicity. However, they do not provide
quantitative estimates of the preferences underlying this behaviour. We now estimate
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the parameters of a number of utility functions, in order to link our empirical analy-
sis to behavioural theory. We work under the assumption that drivers are ‘narrowly
bracketing’ their decisions, and thus, are not taking into account the annual income of
the passenger or themselves (Read et al., 1999).
To begin, it is assumed that each driver has distributional preferences over their own
payoff, m, and the passenger’s payoff, y. For a given journey, the driver’s payoff is equal
to the amount paid by the passenger, s ∈ {4, 8}, minus the amount of journey he gives
them for free, x ∈ [0, x¯], and minus the fuel costs associated with the entire journey,
g(x) · p, where g(x) is the distance of the journey in miles, and p the price in fuel per
mile travelled: m = s− x− g(x) · p. When the driver selects x = 0, he stops when the
meter reaches the amount the passenger can afford; x = x¯ implies he completed the
journey. The passenger’s payoff is defined as being equal to the amount given to her by
the driver, x, so y = x. As the appearance characteristics of the tester are not found
to be significant determinants of amounts given at the 5% level, as outlined in Table
4.10, we exclude these from the structural model.15
The distance driven by the driver for each journey is approximated using the final
meter reading and corresponding fare table for each local authority, and we assume there
were no wait times. For each journey we calculate the drivers’ fuel costs conditional on
the traffic intensity, as reported by the tester, and use fuel costs per mile based on the
fuel efficiency of the LTI TXII Hackney Carriage.16
We incorporate traffic intensity into the model as traffic flows will affect a driver’s
fuel costs, with a higher traffic intensity forcing the driver to break more often, or drive
in a lower, less fuel–efficient gear. When traffic intensity is reported below the median
of 4, we assume fuel efficiency to take a high extra–urban rate of 42 miles per gallon
(£0.12 per mile), an urban rate of 29 miles per gallon when it is below average (£0.17
per mile) and a combined rate of 36 miles per gallon when it is equal to the average
(£0.14 per mile).17,18 The price of fuel is taken to be £1.10 per litre, the average price
of diesel at the time the experiment took place, which is assumed to be identical across
drivers.
15Pearson’s correlation coefficients reveal the following correlations with the amount given and ap-
pearance characteristics: aggressiveness, r = −0.03, attractiveness, r = 0.09, friendliness, r = 0.02,
trustworthiness, r = 0.05 and wealthiness p = 0.06. None are significant at conventional levels (p > 0.1
in all cases).
16This model of taxi is chosen as it is the most common amongst the drivers we surveyed, as shown in
Table 4.14 in Section 4.7. In reality, there are only small differences in fuel efficiency between models.
17Our estimates are quantitatively robust to changes in how traffic affects the drivers’ fuel costs.
18Fuel efficiency figures are taken from http://www.fuel-economy.co.uk/mpg.php.
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Model Functional Form Description Reference
(1) u(y,m) = myθ Cobb-Douglas Cox et al. (2007)
(2) u(y,m) = m+ θyα Inequity Aversion  Fehr & Schmidt (1999)
(3) u(y,m) = (mα + θyα)α−1 CES♦ Cox et al. (2007)
 When α = 1, both models (2) and (3) are identical to the Fehr & Schmidt (1999)
model of inequality aversion.
♦ Constant Elasticity of Substitution.
Table 4.12: Estimated Functional Forms
Table 4.12 outlines the three functional forms of utility that we estimate. Due to the
nature of the driver’s choice, the forms estimated are limited to one and two param-
eter specifications. Across specifications, parameter θ represents the other-regarding
preference parameter, or the utility weight that the driver places on the payoff of the
passenger. Parameter α, in specifications (2) and (3), is a convexity parameter. In all
cases, when α = 1, utility is linear. The specification of Cox et al. (2007) in models
(1) and (3) are chosen because in these functions drivers’ preferences are homothetic:
preferences over relative payoffs are well defined, and our data suggests drivers have
such preferences. Model (3) is particularly flexible, as outlined by Cox et al. (2007). A
generalised form of the Fehr & Schmidt (1999) inequity averse function is selected in
model (2) due to its prominence in the literature: incorporating a convexity parame-
ter will allow us to examine if utility is linear in own and others’ payoffs, as is often
assumed.
In each specification, following Chen & Li (2009), ethnic identity is incorporated
into the model by assuming that other–regarding preferences, θ, are group contingent,
and that these preferences are a function of the ethnic identities of the driver and tester.
We specify θ as the following function,
θ = θ¯ · (1 + a ·m1 + b ·m2 + c ·m3 + d ·m4 + e ·m5) + , (4.1)
where mi are dummy variables that take values of 1, conditional on the driver’s
and passenger’s ethnicity; m1 and m2 take values of 1 when the driver is white, and
when the passenger is black or South–Asian respectively; m3, m4 and m5 take values
of 1 when the driver is South–Asian, and when the passenger is white, black or South–
Asian. We limit the analysis to journeys with white and South–Asian drivers due to the
small number of journeys taken with black drivers. Journeys with both a white driver
and a white passenger are taken as the baseline. The identity parameters, a, b, c, d and
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Model Specification
Ethnicities Without Identity With Identity
Driver Passenger (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
σ 0.652* 0.857** 0.279*** 0.634* 0.741* 0.258***
(0.362) (0.438) (0.101) (0.357) (0.385) (0.089)
θ¯ 0.021 0.811*** 0.576*** 0.287*** 1.245*** 0.721***
(0.061) (0.104) (0.199) (0.109) (0.214) (0.137)
α 0.655*** 0.84*** 0.676*** 0.846***
(0.134) (0.098) (0.128) (0.089)
White Black a -0.781*** -0.244 -0.132
(0.235) (0.173) (0.104)
White S. Asian b 0.53 0.114 0.043
(0.530) (0.119) (0.062)
S. Asian White c -0.935*** -0.359* -0.181
(0.336) (0.196) (0.138)
S. Asian Black d -2.512*** -0.856*** -0.481*
(0.818) (0.309) (0.264)
S. Asian S. Asian e -1.05 -0.37 -0.209
(0.980) (0.387) (0.27)
Observations 132 132 132 132 132 132
Note: Standard errors clustered at the tester level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Only journeys from the
No Reputation treatment are used, from both the Short and Long distance treatments. Journeys
where the driver stopped before the meter reached the amount the tester could afford are coded
as the driver giving £0. Reduced form estimates that support these results are given in Table
C.2 in Appendix C.2.
Table 4.13: Structural Parameter Estimates
e, therefore capture the additional effects of variations in the drivers’ and passengers’
ethnicity on θ. The function θ is assumed to be identical across drivers, except for an
idiosyncratic error term,  ∼ G(0, σ2), where G is the type I extreme value distribution.
The estimation strategy is outlined in Appendix C.2.
First, we estimate the parameters θ¯, α, and σ, with the following restriction:
a = b = c = d = e = 0. The results are displayed in Table 4.13 under the With-
out Identity heading. Second, we remove the identity parameter restrictions, and let
the model pick their values; the results are displayed in Table 4.13 under the With
Identity heading. The parameters are estimated using only the journeys from the No
Reputation treatment to avoid any potential confounding effects originating from the
drivers’ reputational concerns, with observations clustered at the tester level.19
19The results are quantitatively similar if the parameters are estimated pooling the observations
from both the No Reputation and Reputation treatment.
87
xm
Baseline: θ = 0.287
S.Asian–Black θ = −0.434
S.Asian–White θ = 0.019




Baseline: θ = 1.245
S.Asian–Black θ = 0.179





Baseline: θ = 0.721




Note: The passenger’s payoff, x, is plotted on the x axis and the driver’s payoff, m, is plotted on the
y axis. In each panel, the thick black curve represents a hypothetical ‘budget line’. In Figure 4.4b,
α = 0.676, and in Figure 4.4c, α = 0.846, for each of the indifference curves, as estimated in Table
4.13. Where identity parameters are found not to be significant, other–regarding preferences are taken
to be equal to the baseline.
Figure 4.4: Estimated Indifference Curves
Models (1), (2) and (3) in Table 4.13 each outline how the drivers have other–
regarding preferences. In the single parameter specification of model (1), although θ¯ is
not significantly different to 0 (p > 0.1), the dispersion of preferences, σ, is found to
be significant, suggesting many of the drivers do have other–regarding preferences. In
models (2) and (3), θ¯ is estimated to be positive and significant at the 1% level, with
significant preference heterogeneity reported, with σ > 0 (p ≤ 0.1 across models).20
Interestingly, when identity is included, the estimates of α, θ¯ and σ remain robust.
In those models that include identity, a number of patterns relating to ethnic identity
emerge. First, parameter d is reported to be negative and significant, with p ≤ 0.01 in
model (1) and (2), and p = 0.06 in models (3). This suggests that South–Asian drivers’
other–regarding preferences are significantly smaller when faced with a black passenger,
in comparison to both white and South–Asian passengers; in model (1), giving to a black
passenger is estimated to be a bad for a South–Asian driver (see Figure 4.4a).
Second, weak evidence that white driver preferences are reduced when faced with
a black passengers is reported, with a = −0.781 (p < 0.01) in model (1), although its
significance is not robust to specification changes. The parameter measuring the effect of
20For comparison, Cox et al. (2007) estimate model (3) using dictator game data, with slightly
different assumptions regarding , and report θ = 0.417 and α = 0.255.
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South–Asian / white interactions, c, is similar, estimated to be negative and significant
in models (1) and (weakly) significant in model (2) (p = 0.06), but insignificant in
model (3) (p > 0.1). Finally, no evidence is found that white drivers’ preferences are
influenced by South–Asian passengers, with b found to be positive, but insignificant in
all models (p > 0.1 in all cases). Figure 4.4 plots the estimated indifference curves from
model (1), (2) and (3) graphically.
4.6 Robustness checks
As we examine the data for heterogeneous treatment effects for different ethnic sub-
groups, the statistical significance of some of these effects may be an artefact of multiple
hypothesis testing. To account for this, we adjust the calculated p-values used to sup-
port Results 4, 5 and 6 using the Holm–Bonferroni procedure (Holm, 1979). This
procedure is used over the more conservative Bonferroni procedure because of its in-
creased power (Holm, 1979; List et al., 2016). We first consider the robustness of the
p–values calculated from non–parametric testing, and then those obtained from the
regression analysis.
For each result in Section 4.5, Table C.3, given in Appendix C.2, presents the
unadjusted and Holm–Bonferroni adjusted p–values for each hypothesis tested given
the ‘family’ of hypotheses each test falls into. Similar to List et al. (2016), we define the
‘family’ of hypotheses as the group of tests related to a particular outcome compared
within a treatment, or the group of tests related to a particular outcome compared
between treatments.
Table C.4, also given in Appendix C.2, presents the adjusted p–values for the hy-
pothesis tests conducted on the Black, South–Asian and Male dummies from each of the
regression models in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 in Section 4.5. To adjust the p–values,
the family of hypotheses is defined as the number of variables of interest tested for
significance within each regression, given in the final column as m. We include within
the family of tests, where appropriate, ethnicity, gender and appearance characteristics.
The adjusted p–values in Table C.3 and C.4 provide a number of insights. First,
the negative differential between giving to black and white testers concluded in Result
4 is robust: both the non–parametric and parametric results are robust to adjustments
for multiplicity (Hypotheses 1, 7, 10, 16, 17, Table C.3 and Hypotheses 1–5, Table
C.4). The difference in giving between South–Asian and black testers is reasonably
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robust, but only remains significant when all observations from both the Short and
Long distance treatments are pooled (Hypothesis 9, Table C.3). Second, although the
non–parametric results in support of Result 5 are not found to be significant once
adjusted (Hypotheses 10–12, Table C.3), the parametric results are found to be robust
(Hypotheses 19–21, Table C.4). However, Result 6 does not appear to be as robust as
Results 4 and 5 (Hypotheses 22 and 28, Table C.3).
4.7 Discussion
Three main questions arise from the results in Section 4.5: (1) can the extent of giving
be explained by the drivers finding a convenient location to stop?; (2) can earnings
expectations stemming from bargaining with passengers explain the drivers’ behaviour?;
(3) can social pressure explain the extent of giving?
To examine questions (1) and (2) we conducted a complementary survey of 50 taxi
drivers from ranks used within the study, 65 passengers that were queuing for a taxi, and
observed the behaviour of 97 passengers entering taxis from a rank.21 To address (1) we
asked drivers the number of daily journeys they take, how many of these journeys are
from taxi ranks and what they believe the average fare is. Drivers were also asked about
the expected fare of an example Short and Long distance journey, where the example
journeys were journeys that we used within the study. They were asked if they would
be willing to bargain over the journey specified before the journey began, and the lowest
fare they would accept if they were willing. In addition, they were asked if they would
be willing to bargain with a passenger who was inside the taxi.22 Finally, we asked them
what they did upon completing a journey using a multiple choice question: return to a
home rank, return to a different rank, cruise and look for a passenger, or do something
else. Passengers were asked if they ever bargained with the driver when catching a taxi
from the rank.
The drivers’ responses are presented in Table 4.14, Panel A, and the passenger
responses and the observation results are presented in Panel B.
The responses in Table 4.14 highlight two main points relating to (1). First, the
vast majority of taxi journeys are taken from ranks (92%). This suggests that giving
to the passenger, by continuing to drive away from the rank, is not done at the drivers’
21The survey and observations were conducted in Manchester. The questionnaire is given in Ap-
pendix C.1.
22Drivers were also asked to report their income, but the majority refused to disclose this information.
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Panel A: Driver Survey, N = 50
No. daily journeys 12
(4.4)
No. journeys that start at a rank 11
(4.47)
Average fare (£) 6.41
(1.4)
Modal Taxi Model LTI TXII
Short Expected fare (£) 6.17
distance (0.778)
journeys Willing to bargain? (1 if yes) 0.06
(0.242)
Lowest fare if willing (£) 4.73
(2.11)
Willing to bargain inside the taxi? (1 if yes) 0.04
(0.2)
Upon completion Return to home rank (73%)
Return to a diff. rank♦ (16%)
Cruise (10%)
Long Expected fare (£) 11.85
distance (1.97)
journeys Willing to bargain? (1 if yes) 0.12
(0.328)
Lowest fare if willing (£) 9.33
(0.328)
Willing to bargain inside the taxi? (1 if yes) 0.04
(0.2)
Upon completion Return to home rank (76%)
Return to a diff. rank♦ (10%)
Cruise (10%)
Panel B: Passenger Survey
Do you bargain? (1 if yes), N = 65 0.03
(0.181)
Observed bargaining (1 if yes), N = 97 0.01
(0.1)
Note: All responses relate to journeys taken between 9am–5pm. Standard deviations in
parentheses.
♦ The majority of drivers specifying this response outlined that they would return to dif-
ferent rank in the centre of the city.
Table 4.14: Driver and Passenger Survey Responses
convenience. On the contrary, driving away from the rank is the same as driving
away from the next passenger, and therefore is costly. Second, only 10% ‘Cruise’ upon
completing a journey, with the vast majority returning to a home rank and only a
minority returning to a different rank: drivers reported returning to busy city ranks.
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This is clearly because that is where the passengers are. Further, as drivers are given
ample time to stop, 975 yards (∼ 1 kilometre) in the Short, and 1950 yards (∼ 2
kilometres) in the Long distance treatment, it seems unlikely they continue out of
convenience. There is even less reason to think the distance required to find a convenient
location to stop is proportional to the length of the journey.
In relation to (2), from Table 4.14 note that only 6% of drivers said they would
bargain with a passenger before the passenger was inside the vehicle for the Short
distance journey, and only 12% in the Long distance journey; the lowest fare they
would accept is also above the amount our testers could afford. The majority would
refuse to bargain with them prior to the journey beginning, and only 2 reported they
would bargain with a passenger mid–journey. Their expected fare estimates are also
in–line with our own calculations. Our survey and observation of passengers also shows
the desire to negotiate is limited, with only a single passenger observed attempting to
bargain with a driver and only 2 reporting that they did bargain with drivers over fares.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that driver giving is the result of earnings expectations
stemming from passenger bargaining, as the vast majority of journeys are not bargained
over.
Question (3) implies that drivers are concerned about appearing unkind to the
passenger, and give despite having a preference not to. This would resonate with the
conclusion of DellaVigna et al. (2012). However, not giving away goods and services
for free in a market setting is unlikely to be perceived as unkind. This contrasts with
charitable giving, where giving to those who need it might be viewed as a normative
action. Further, in the context of our study, passengers could easily have taken an
alternative and cheaper mode of transport, or could have walked the final portion of
the journey they couldn’t afford.23
4.8 Conclusion
We report evidence that the majority of taxi drivers express other–regarding preferences
in transactions completed in a competitive market setting, and find little evidence of
the reputational concerns that are often used to explain such behaviour. Our conclu-
sions contrast with the results of previous prominent field experiments and standard
23A passenger would have to walk∼ 1 kilometre in the Short distance treatment, and∼ 1.8 kilometres
in the Long distance treatment to complete the journey if they exited the taxi at the amount they
could afford.
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economic theory, but resonate with the results of numerous laboratory experiments and
behavioural theories of social preferences. Within a highly competitive market setting,
we observe individuals behaving altruistically.
Variation in the ethnicity of the driver and the tester also allows us to explore
recent theories of discrimination, namely, that other–regarding preferences are group–
contingent. We find strong evidence that the drivers’ propensity to give is significantly
smaller when the passenger is black. This result is robust to controlling for variation
in the testers’ appearance, variation that may otherwise be driving the result. Param-
eter estimates from a number of structural models reveal that white and South–Asian
drivers’ other–regarding preferences are group–contingent, being significantly smaller
when faced with a black passenger. Weaker evidence that South–Asian drivers’ prefer-
ences are reduced when faced with a white passenger are also reported.
The effect of reputation on drivers’ behaviour is also found to be conditional on
the ethnic identity of the passenger. When the passenger is white, drivers behave
significantly more other–regarding, and give significantly more of the ride for free. No
such result is found for black and South–Asian passengers, with a weakly negative effect
of reputation on giving to South–Asians. The potential of a repeated interaction also
fails to remove the differential treatment of testers conditional on their ethnic identity.
This suggests that drivers’ beliefs about the behaviour of individuals also varies with
identity.
We acknowledge that markets where transactions are automated or done through a
computer, such as asset and financial markets, are unlikely to see the types of behaviour
observed here. This is because the nature of the interaction between buyer and seller
does not allow for such preferences to be expressed, as market agents are not given the
opportunity to behave in such a manner. However, many other types of markets exist.
In markets where bilateral face to face interactions are common place we might expect




The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the behavioural theory that social
preferences are group–contingent, or that the differential treatment of others could stem
from discrimination being manifested within individuals’ preferences for the welfare of
others. The chapters in this thesis employ laboratory and field experiments in order
to consider a range of other–regarding preferences, in a multitude of strategic settings
and in both market and non–market frameworks. In each chapter we complement our
findings by structurally modelling subjects’ underlying preferences, directly linking our
empirical findings to the theories we wish to test. Although we find no evidence of such
discriminatory tastes in Chapter 2, Chapters 3 and 4 present compelling evidence that
is consistent with the group–contingent social preference hypothesis.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from our results, each having implications for
future avenues of research. The first is that individuals’ identities are multifaceted and
can influence behaviour in complex ways. This likely explains why no discriminatory
behaviour is observed in Chapter 2 and almost certainly explains the various ethnic
interaction effects observed in Chapter 4. It could also explain the strong negative
out–group discrimination observed in Chapter 3, which contrasts to the positive in–
group discrimination typically observed, possibly a consequence of the social context in
which the experiment is conducted. Future research should be mindful of the ways in
which natural identities interact, particularly when studying diverse subject pools, and
carefully consider how these interactions might be influenced by the context in which
they are being studied.
A second conclusion drawn from this thesis is the importance of institutions in
determining when other–regarding behaviours and discrimination are likely to play
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significant roles. For example, as highlighted by Heckman (1998), economists often (in-
correctly) assume that taste–based discrimination is irrelevant in market settings, with
researchers working under the assumption that competition mitigates these behaviours
and will eventually drive them from the market. The same is true of other–regarding
behaviour (Schmidt, 2011). However, Chapter 4 highlights how such behaviours can
exist in market places, and can have an impact on market outcomes. This conclusion is
likely to be particularly true in de–centralised market places where bilateral face-to-face
interactions are common place, although it is acknowledged that they are unlikely to
play a role in centralised markets. In centralised markets humans do not interact per se,
but instead interact with computers that facilitate transactions between market agents.
Future research should consider the type of market, and the manner in which market
agents interact, in order to determine if other–regarding preferences and discriminatory
behaviour might play a role in the strategic settings being analysed.
As with all research, the research presented in this thesis has its limitations and the
conclusions drawn from this thesis could be strengthened by the collection of additional
data. For example, Chapter 2 provides a replication study that highlights how proce-
dural differences in the laboratory may have consequences for behaviour. Additional
experiments would add robustness to the inference made in that chapter. It would also
be fruitful to supplement the findings from Chapter 2 with data from other replications
of Fehr et al. (2007). For example, an analysis of the data collected from the on line
laboratory of Charles Holt, the VECON Lab, which has a significant amount of data on
the experimental game studied in Chapter 2, might provide additional insight into that
chapter’s conclusions.1 This avenue of improvement is being actively pursued. This also
raises the possibility that the experiments were statistically underpowered, or that the
null results observed in each of the chapters is a result of poor experimental planning.
Appendix D provides a retrospective power analysis, which shows that the experiments
are powered at conventional levels.
In conclusion, this thesis highlights how discriminatory tastes can manifest them-
selves in social and other–regarding preferences. It explores how these preferences can
have implications in both market and non–market settings, and uses structural mod-
elling techniques to retrieve deep preference parameters. As far as the author of this
thesis is aware, the research contained within this thesis presents the first estimates
of social preference parameters obtained using real market interactions and the first to
1The VECON Lab can be found at the following address: http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/.
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show that these preferences are influenced by ethnicity. As highlighted in the discussion
of Al-Ubaydli & List (2016), structural modelling permits welfare and counterfactual
analyses, and as such it is crucial for deepening economists’ understanding of markets
and market dynamics. It is hoped that the work contained in this thesis makes a
contribution to that understanding.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
This appendix provides the experimental material for Chapter 2, including instructions
and screenshots of the zTree interface.
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A.1 Experimental Appendix
NB: The appearance of these instructions differs slightly to those used in
the experiment due to differences in document formatting.
Introduction
You are about to take part in an experiment in decision-making. Various institutions
have provided the funds for this research. The total amount of money you earn depends
upon the decisions you make and on the decisions that other people make. Throughout
the experiment we will speak in terms of tokens and not pounds. At the end of the
experiment you will be paid in cash based on the following exchange rate:
1 token = 4p
You will be given an initial endowment of 100 tokens. In addition to this initial
endowment you have already earned a 2.50 show up fee. At the end of the experi-
ment, everyone will be paid in private, with no obligation to tell others how much you
earn. It is also important to note that any decisions you make will remain anonymous
throughout the session and once the experimental session is complete.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If
you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of
these rules.We will first jointly go over the instructions. Once the instructions have
been read through, you will have time to ask any clarifying questions by raising your
hand. Do not touch the computers until you are instructed to.
Instructions
In this experiment you will take part in a task. You will be randomly assigned to a
Role, the role of Principal or the role of Agent. There are 20 people in this experiment
and exactly half of you are assigned as Principals, the other half as Agents. There are
therefore 10 Agents and 10 Principals. If you are assigned as a Principal you will remain
a Principal for the entire session; if you are assigned as an Agent you will remain an
Agent for the entire session. We will now go through the instructions for the task.
The task involves 10 Periods. In each Period you will be matched to one other
person. If you are a Principal you will always be matched to an Agent. You will be
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matched to every Agent exactly once, in a random order. If you are an Agent you will
always be matched to a Principal. You will be matched to every Principal exactly once,
in a random order. In each period an information box is displayed which reminds you
of your Role and the Role of the person you are matched to.
Each of the 10 Periods consists of 3 sequential Stages. In each stage that you are
required to make a decision, you have a maximum of 60 seconds to make it. The time
limit is always displayed in the top right hand corner of your screen. If time runs out
a message will be displayed encouraging you to reach a decision. It is important to
understand that the experiment cannot continue to the next stage until everyone has
made a decision. We will now explain each stage in detail.
In stage 1 the Principal makes a decision. The Principal must first decide whether
or not to offer a contract to the Agent. If no contract is offered both get 0 tokens in
that Period and both must wait until the next Period. If the Principal makes an offer,
they must specify the following 3 components of a contract:
1. a fixed wage offer in tokens to be paid to the Agent, w. This choice can be any
whole number between 0 and the total amount of tokens the Principal has. If the
Agent accepts the contract they will receive this wage for certain.
2. demand an effort level from the Agent, e∗. The Agent has 10 effort levels to
choose from. One must be specified from between 1 and 10. The actual effort
choice the Agent makes can be different from this value.
3. an announced bonus, in tokens, which could be given to the Agent as an additional
grant in Stage 3, b∗. This can take any whole number from 0 to 100. A screen
shot of Stage 1 is provided below:
The screen consists of a number of boxes and tables:
(a) The Information Box.
(b) The Agents Effort-Cost Table.
Effort is costly to the Agent. This table displays the costs associated with each
effort level the Agent could choose. As an example, an effort choice of 1 has a cost
of 0 tokens associated with it whilst a choice of 10 has a cost of 20 tokens.3. The
Decision Box. The Principal makes their choices in this box. They initially must
decide whether or not to make an offer, pressing continue to make their choice.
If they decide to make an offer, the box will change and look as follows:
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Figure A.1: Stage 1
Figure A.2: Box 1
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Figure A.3: Stage 2
Once the Principal has made a decision they must click continue; the stage ends
and moves to Stage 2.
In Stage 2 The Agent must make a decision in Stage 2. If a contract is offered, the
Agent can first either accept or reject it. If the contract is rejected, both the Principal
and Agent get 0 tokens that Period and must wait until the next Period. If the Agent
accepts the contract, they receive the wage offer w for certain. The Agent must then
make a decision:
• choose an effort level e.
The effort choice e is allowed to differ from the effort demanded by the Principal
e∗. Effort is costly and for the effort choice e, the Agent incurs a cost in tokens. The
Agent can choose an effort from 1 to 10, and the costs for each effort level are shown
in the Agent’s Effort-Cost table: A screen shot of Stage 2 is provided below:
The screen consists of a number of boxes and tables:
1. Information Box
2. The Agents Effort-Cost Table.
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Figure A.4: Box 2
3. The Contract Offer Box. This box outlines the contract offered by the Principal
to the Agent, if one has been offered. If one hasn’t been offered, the Agent will
be informed.
4. The Decision Box. The Agent makes their choice in this box. They must first
decide whether to accept or reject, clicking the Continue button to make their
choice. If they reject, both must wait until the next period. If they accept, the
decision box changes as shown below
Once the Agent has made a choice they must click continue; the stage ends and
moves to Stage 3.
The Principal makes a decision in Stage 3. If the Agent rejects the contract, the
Principal is informed. If the Agent accepts the contract and chooses an effort level,
the Principal must then decide on an actual bonus payment, b. This bonus payment
can differ from b∗ the announced bonus payment made in Stage 1. The actual bonus
payment can be between 0 and 100.
Stage 3 looks as follows:
The Profits received by the Principal and Agent are calculated at the end of each
Period. If the Principal does not offer a contract or the Agent rejects the offer both the
Principal and the Agent get 0 Tokens that Period. If a contract is offered and accepted,
the Profits in each period are calculated as follows:
The Principal : pip = 10e − w − b (The effort choice of the Agent multiplied by
10, minus the wage and minus the actual bonus payment to the Agent), the Agent:
piA = w-effortcost+b
(The wage minus the Agent’s effort-cost plus the actual bonus payment from the
Principal) Your Total Profit is the sum of all your Profits from previous Periods plus
your initial endowment. It should be noted that the number of tokens the Principal
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Figure A.5: Stage 3
has, as shown in the information box, updates between Stages. In Stage 3, if the Agent
has accepted the contract in Stage 2 and selected an effort choice, the tokens that the
Principal has earned so far this period are added to their tokens in the information box
(ten times the Agent effort choice from Stage 2 is added whilst the wage that was paid
in Stage 1 is subtracted). The actual bonus payment is subtracted from the Principal’s
tokens at the end of Stage 3.
At the end of each period you will be shown the outcome from that Period and then
rematched to another participant and the next period will begin.
Practice Exercises
NB: There were three practice exercises given to subjects, for the sake
of space, only one is outlined below.
We will now go through two practice exercises to ensure your understanding of the
Task. Assume for these questions that both the Principal and the Agent are initially
endowed with 100 tokens. Please refer to the instructions above to aid you in answering
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the questions. Once you have answered all the questions, please raise your hand and
an experimenter will come and check your answers.
In Period 1, suppose the Principal offers the following contract in stage 1: w=10,e∗=10
and b∗=10. Suppose the Agent accepts and chooses the following effort level in stage
2:e = 3 and the Principal pays the following bonus in stage 3:b = 5
• What is the Principal’s Profit at the end of this Period?
• What are the Principal’s Total Profit at the end of this Period?
• What is the cost to the Agent of the effort choice (you may wish to look at the
Agent’s effort-cost table)?
• What is the Agent’s Profit at the end of this Period?
• What are the Agent’s Total Profit at the end of this Period?
• If the Agent had rejected the contract offer in Period 1, stage 2 what would the
Profits for the Principal and Agent be?
If you have any further questions now the exercise has finished, please raise your
hand and an experimenter will come to you.
You can now begin the Task by pressing Continue on your screen.
A.1.1 Instructions for the identity inducement procedure
Introduction
You are about to take part in an experiment in decision-making. Various institutions
have provided the funds for this research. The total amount of money you earn depends
upon the decisions you make and on the decisions that other people make. Throughout
the experiment we will speak in terms of tokens and not pounds. At the end of the
experiment you will be paid in cash based on the following exchange rate:
1 token = 4p
You will be given an initial endowment of 100 tokens. In addition to this initial
endowment you have already earned a 2.50 show up fee. At the end of the experi-
ment, everyone will be paid in private, with no obligation to tell others how much you
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earn. It is also important to note that any decisions you make will remain anonymous
throughout the session and once the experimental session is complete.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If
you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be
asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of
these rules.We will first jointly go over the instructions. Once the instructions have
been read through, you will have time to ask any clarifying questions by raising your
hand. Do not touch the computers until you are instructed to.
Instructions
The experiment is split into 2 parts, Part 1 and Part 2. In each part you will
be asked to make one or more decisions and will have a chance to earn money. The
amount of money you will earn in each part of the experiment will depend on your
decisions and may depend on other participants’ decisions. The total amount you will
earn from the experiment will be the sum of the earnings you make in the two parts
of the experiment. You will be informed about your earnings from Part 1 at the end
of the session. Therefore in Part 2 you will make your decisions without knowing any
outcome from Part 1. We will now jointly go over the instructions for Part 1. You will
receive the instructions for Part 2 once everyone has completed Part 1.
Part 1
In PART 1 of the experiment you and the other participants will be assigned to
a group. There are twenty participants in this experiment. Ten participants will be
randomly assigned to the RED group, and ten other participants will be assigned to
the GREEN group. You will not learn the identity of the other participants in your
group, during or after today’s session.
Once every participant has been randomly assigned to a group, you will be shown a
screen with six paintings that belong to two artists: Artist A and Artist B. You will be
given 180 seconds (3 minutes) to inspect the paintings. During these 180 seconds, you
can use a group chat program to discuss the paintings with the other members in your
own group. Messages will be shared only among the members of your own group. You
will not be able to see the messages exchanged among the members of the other group.
People in the other group will not see the messages from your group. Once 180 seconds
117
has elapsed, your screen will change. You will then be shown four more paintings and
you will need, for each painting, to select the artist who you think made the painting.
You will be given 180 seconds (3 minutes) for this task. During these 180 seconds, you
can continue using the group chat program to get help from or offer help to the other
members in your own group. Messages will be shared only among the members of your
own group. For each correct answer, you will be rewarded with 20 tokens.
When you use the chat program, you can type whatever you want in the lower box
of the chat program, except for the following restrictions.
Restrictions on messages
1. You must not identify yourself or send any information that could be used to
identify you (for example, your name, contact details or seat in the room)
2. You must not make any threats, insults or use any obscene or offensive language.
If you violate these rules your payment will be forfeited.
You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. Please raise
your hand if you have any questions.
A.2 Pictures used in the identity study
Figure A.6 shows the three Paul Klee and three Wassily Kandinsky paintings that
subjects had to consider privately in the identity inducement procedure. Figure A.7
shows the two Paul Klee and two Wassily Kandinsky paintings that subjects had to
identify whilst being able to chat to their group members. The artist, title, and year
the pictures were painted, are given below each picture.
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(a) Paul Klee: Castle and
Sun, 1928
(b) Paul Klee: Flora on
Sand, 1927








Figure A.6: The Six Paintings Subjects were
Required to Consider Privately in the Identity Study.
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(a) Paul Klee: Fire in the Evening, 1929 (b) Paul Klee: Red Balloon, 1922
(c) Wassily Kandinsky: Several Circles, 1926
(d) Wassily Kandinsky: On White II,
1923
Figure A.7: The Four Paintings Subjects were Asked
to Identify in the Identity Study.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
This appendix provides supplementary material for Chapter 3. Section B.1 provides the
experimental materials used in the data collection, including instructions and decision
sheets. Section B.2 provides survey responses not included in the main text. Section
B.3 provides an in-depth derivation of the likelihood function used in Section 3.5.
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B.1 Experimental Appendix
B.1.1 Experimental instructions - Part 1
Instructions (Part 1)
In Part 1 you will be asked to make three choices. These choices will be referred to as Choice
1, Choice 2 and Choice 3. In each Choice, you will be randomly matched to two people chosen
from a list compiled from the Edited Electoral Register for the Rochdale area. These two people will
be called Person A and Person B. Person A and Person B will not be required to make a decision.
In each Choice, the surnames of Person A and Person B will be revealed. No other information
about these people can be given. Even if the surnames are identical between Choices, the people will
be diﬀerent.
In each Choice, you will be asked how to split 10 pounds between Person A and Person B.
You can allocate the 10 pounds however you like, as long as the allocation adds up to 10 pounds and
the amount given to each person is in whole pounds. You cannot allocate money to yourself.
Once the study is complete, one of these three Choices will be chosen at random, and Person A
and Person B from that Choice will receive payment in cash.
The Person A and Person B that are chosen to receive payment, will not know they have taken
part in this experiment until they receive a letter with the amount of money you have allocated them.
The amount you decide to send will be placed in an envelope and will be delivered through Person
A’s and Person B’s door. Person A and Person B will not learn any information about you.
You will not earn any money in Part 1.
When a Choice is chosen, the amount of money Person A and B will earn in pounds will be:
The amount that you allocate them.
To make sure you fully understand what is asked of you, please complete the three practice questions
below. Once you have finished, please let the instructor know so that they can check your answers:
1. How much will you earn in Part 1?_________________________
2. If you allocate Person A 2 pounds:
(a) How much will Person A earn?________________
(b) How much will Person B earn?_______________
3. If you allocate Person A 8 pounds:
(a) How much will Person A earn?________________
(b) How much will Person B earn?_______________
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B.1.2 Other–other decision sheets
Part 1 Answer Sheet
Choice 1
c









Person B’s surname is_________________________
c
Write the amount of pounds you would like to allocate to each Person in the
boxes below. The amounts allocated must add up to 10.




Once you have made your decision please turn over.
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B.1.3 Experimental instructions - Part 2
Instructions (Part 2)
In Part 2 you will be given £10. You will then bematched to a person randomly chosen from a list
compiled from the Edited Electoral Register for the Rochdale area. This person will be called your
match. Your match is not the same person as anyone you allocated money to in Part 1. Before you
make your decision I have to tell you the surname of your match.
Their surname is ________________. I can’t reveal any other information about your
match.
You will be required to make a single decision. Your match will not be required to make a decision.
You will be asked how many of the 10 pounds that you have been given you would like to send to
your match. You can make any choice between 0 and 10. Your choice must be in whole pounds and
not pence. The amount you decide to send will be placed in an envelope and will be delivered through
your match’s door with an accompanying letter. Your match will not know they have taken part in
this experiment until they receive a letter with the amount of money you decide to send them. Your
match will not learn your surname or any information about you.
The amount of money you earn in Part 2 in pounds will be :
10 minus the number of pounds you send.
The amount of money your match will earn in pounds will be:
The amount that you send them.
To make sure you fully understand what is asked of you, please complete the three practice questions
below. Once you have finished, please let the instructor know so that they can check your answers:
1. If you send £0 how much will:
(a) you earn in Part 2?_________________________
(b) your match earn?________________
2. If you send £5 how much will:
(a) you earn in Part 2?_________________________
(b) your match earn?________________
3. If you send £10 how much will:
(a) you earn in Part 2?_________________________
(b) your match earn?________________
4. Does your match know they are taking part?__________
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B.1.4 Dictator game decision sheet
Part 2 Answer Sheet
c




Your match’s surname is_________________________
c
Write the amount of pounds you would like to send to your match in the
box below.
Once you have made your decision please turn over.
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B.2 Statistical Appendix
B.2.1 Survey and responses
here
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Male, 1 if yes 122 0.443 0.499
Married, 1 if yes 121 0.372 0.634
No. Children 113 0.628 0.485
Employed 119 0.429 0.696
Income∗ 100 0.36 0.612
Education† 117 0.906 0.83
Housing benefit, 1 if yes 121 0.678 0.469
Years Living in Rochdale 120 26.142 16.353
Beliefs∗∗ 103 3.738 3.106
Note: Observations differ due to missing entries.
0 if unemployed, 1 if employed, 2 if retired.
∗0 if income < £10000, 1 if £10000 < income ≤ £20,0000, 2
if £20000 < income ≤ £30,0000 .
†0 if no qualifications, 1 if GCSE level, 2 if A–level, 3 if Degree,
4 if postgraduate.
** Subjects’ belief about the experimenter’s expectation of their
behaviour in the Dictator Game.
B.3 Structural Appendix
B.3.1 Constructing the likelihood function
Fixing the parameters α, θ, a, b, for each x ∈ {0, 1, ..., 10} we can determine the critical
values of  where the subjects utility maximising choice changes, x. This is because
the utility maximising choice of x, x∗, varies with . The dictator will choose to send
an amount x over x+ 1 up until,
u(x;α, θ, a, b, x) = u(x+ 1;α, θ, a, b, x). (B.1)
Rearranging for x gives
x =
(s+ ω − x)α − (s+ ω − x− 1)α
(x+ 1)α − xα − θ(1 + ae+ bm) (B.2)
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(s+ ω − x)α − (s+ ω − x− 1)α
(x+ 1)α − xα − θ(1 + ae+ bm)
)
(B.3)
When  ∈ (x−1, x), x∗ = x. The probability of choosing x∗ = x can then be determined
from the cumulative distribution function of the error term. Where f(z) is the density
function, and F (z) the cumulative distribution, the probability that the dictator chooses
x∗ = 0 is the probability that  ∈ (−∞, 0), or
Pr[x∗ = 0|α, θ, a, b, σ] =
∫ 0
−∞
f(z)dz = F (0). (B.4)
The probability the dictator chooses x∗ = x ∈ {1, 2, ..., 9} is
Pr[x∗ = x|α, θ, a, b, σ] =
∫ x
x−1
f(z)dz = F (x)− F (x−1), (B.5)
and the probability of choosing x∗ = 10 is
Pr[x∗ = 10|α, θ, a, b, σ] =
∫ ∞
9
f(z)dz = 1− F (9).
The likelihood function, as we have k = 122 observations, is therefore
L(α, θ, a, b, σ) =
122∏
k=1
Pr[xk = x;α, θ, a, b, σ]. (B.6)
127
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
This appendix provides supplementary material for Chapter 4. Section C.1 provides
the experimental materials used in the data collection, including job advertisements,
experimental script sheets, decision sheets and surveys. Section C.2 presents additional















We	 are	 looking	 for	 48	 individuals	 to	 help	 us	 conduct	 some	 economic	 research.	 You	will	 begin	 by	
receiving	 training,	and	 then	be	asked	 to	complete	a	 task.	This	 task	 is	very	 simple.	The	work	 is	not	
recurring,	 and	 is	 a	 onetime	offer	 from	 the	 researchers.	 Researchers	 from	University	 of	 Exeter	 are	
conducting	this	research.	
Due	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 research,	 the	 exact	 task	 will	 only	 be	 revealed	 to	 successful	 applicants.	
However,	the	task	will	involve	travelling	on	foot	for	short	distances.	Some	knowledge	of	Manchester	
City	Centre	is	a	definite	bonus.	It	cannot	be	stressed	enough	that	no	prior	experience,	knowledge,	









application	 reviewed	 by	 a	 specialist	 panel.	 If	 you	 are	 successful,	 the	 researchers	 will	 require	 this	
picture	before	you	can	take	part	in	the	task.	
This	 research	 study	 has	 been	 reviewed	 by	 the	 Humanities	 &	 Social	 Sciences	 Ethical	 Review	
























Tester	ID:	 		 Ride	ID:	 	 	 	 	











Male	 ☐	 	 		
Female	 ☐	 		 		
3	 Age	 	 	 	 		
4	 Raining	
Yes	 ☐	 		 		
No	 ☐	 		 		
5	
Traffic	 		 		 		 		
(1=	Not	busy	10=Busy)	 		 		 		 		
6	 Driver	tried	to	have	a	conversation	
Yes	 ☐	 		 		
No	 ☐	 		 		
7	 Driver	Offered	to	take	you	to	a	cash	point	
Yes	 ☐	 	 		
No	 ☐	 		 		
8	 Driver	Completed	the	Journey	
Yes	 ☐	 	 		
No	 ☐	 		 		
9	 Meter	Reading	when	you	left	the	taxi	
	 	 	 		
		 		 		 		
10	 Did	the	driver	give	you	a	receipt?	
Yes	 ☐	 	 		
No	 ☐	 		 		
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C.1.5 Ex-post driver survey
	
All	questions	are	about	passengers	taken	between	9am-5pm	
	1. How	many	passenger	journeys	do	you	normally	complete	between	9am	and	5pm?				 2. How	many	of	those	journeys	start	from	a	taxi	rank?				 3. What	is	the	average	fare	for	someone	catching	a	taxi	from	a	taxi	rank?			 		4. What	is	the	lowest	fare	you	would	accept	for	a	journey	starting	from	a	taxi	rank?				 5. How	many	of	those	passengers	taking	a	journey	from	a	rank	would	leave	a	tip?				 6. How	much	would	they	leave	as	a	tip,	on	average?				 7. How	much	do	you	earn	per	day,	on	average?				 --------------------------------------------------------------------------	Consider	a	journey	from	Manchester	Piccadilly	Station	to	the	Coronation	
Street	Tour.		8. How	much	would	you	expect	the	fare	for	this	journey	to	be?				9. Would	you	let	a	passenger	bargain	with	you	on	the	price	of	this	journey	before	they	entered	the	taxi?	a. Yes	b. No		10. If	yes,	what	is	the	lowest	fare	you	would	accept	for	this	journey?	
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	11. Would	you	let	a	passenger	bargain	with	you	on	the	fare	of	this	journey	whilst	you	were	driving	the	taxi?		 a. Yes	b. No		 12. If	yes,	what	is	the	lowest	fare	you	would	accept	for	this	journey?				 13. Once	you	had	completed	this	journey	would	you:	(Please	circle	one)		 a. Return	to	Manchester	Piccadilly		b. Return	to	a	different	taxi	rank.	(Please	state	which	one.)			c. `Cruise’	and	look	for	a	passenger	to	hail	you	down.			 d. Something	different	(please	specify):					Consider	a	journey	from	Manchester	Piccadilly	Station	to	the	Stretford	Mall.		14. How	much	would	you	expect	the	fare	for	this	journey	to	be?			 	15. Would	you	let	a	passenger	bargain	with	you	on	the	price	of	this	journey	before	they	entered	the	taxi?		 a. Yes	b. No		16. If	yes,	what	is	the	lowest	fare	you	would	accept	for	this	journey?				 	17. Would	you	let	a	passenger	bargain	with	you	on	the	fare	of	this	journey	whilst	you	were	driving	the	taxi?		 a. Yes	b. N0	
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C.2.1 Constructing the likelihood function
We assume the driver decides to stop based entirely on the taxi meter. As the meter
increases in discrete amounts, the driver therefore makes a discrete choice: stop now,
or wait until the next ‘pulse’ of the meter. This assumption seems reasonable, as each
‘pulse’ of the meter quantifies an exact distance driven. The driver must choose how
many ‘pulses’ to give for free, x, bounded by the number of pulses until the journey
is completed: x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., x¯}, where x¯ is the maximum number of pulses the driver
can give for a given journey. When x = x¯, the driver completes the journey.
Estimation begins from the observation that for any of the utility specifications
outlined in Table 12, the driver’s utility maximising choice of x, x∗, varies only with ,
the idiosyncratic error.
Fixing the model parameters, α, θ, a, b, c, d and e, we can determine the values of
 at which the driver’s choice changes, x. A driver will give x to the passenger over
x+ 1 until
u(x;α, θ, a, b, c, d, e, x) = u(x+ 1;α, θ, a, b, c, d, e, x). (C.1)
Taking the Cox et. al (2007) form as the example, u(x) = [(s−x−g(x)·p)α+θxα]α−1,
Equation C.1 can be rearranged as
x =
(s− x− g(x) · p)α − (s− x− g(x+ 1) · p− 1)α
(x+ 1)α − xα − θ,
where θ = θ¯ · (1 + a ·m1 + b ·m2 + c ·m3 + d ·m4 + e ·m5), as defined in Section 5.3.







(s− x− g(x) · p)α − (s− x− g(x+ 1) · p− 1)α
(x+ 1)α − xα − θ
)
. (C.2)
When  ∈ (x−1, x), then x∗ = x; the probability of choosing x can therefore be
determined from the cumulative distribution function of the error term. Where f(z)
is the density function, and F (z) the cumulative distribution, the probability that the
driver chooses x∗ = 0 (i.e. stops at the amount the tester can afford) is the probability
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that  ∈ (−∞, 0), or
Pr[x∗ = 0|α, θ, a, b, c, d, e, σ] =
∫ 0
−∞
f(z)dz = F (0). (C.3)
The probability the driver chooses x∗ = q ∈ {1, 2, ..., x¯− 1} is
Pr[x∗ = q|α, θ, a, b, c, d, e, σ] =
∫ x
x−1
f(z)dz = F (x)− F (x−1), (C.4)
and the probability the driver completes the journey, x∗ = x¯, is
Pr[x∗ = x¯|α, θ, a, b, c, d, e, σ] =
∫ ∞
x¯−1
f(z)dz = 1− F (x¯−1). (C.5)
The likelihood function, using 132 journeys from the No Reputation treatment, as
specified in Section 5.3, is therefore
L(α, θ, a, b, c, d, e, σ) =
132∏
k=1
Pr[xk = x;α, θ, a, b, c, d, e, σ]. (C.6)
Taking logs gives the log–likelihood function, which can then be maximised with
respect to the model parameters.
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Note: 108 subjects took part in the rating task. The Mixed–Race category includes anyone who
reported more than one ethnicity. The Unknown category includes those who did not report their
ethnicity and those who reported an ambiguous ethnic affiliation.
Figure C.1: Distribution of the Raters’
Self–Reported Ethnicity
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C.2.3 Testers’ appearance characteristics
Panel A: Appearance Correlations, Pooled
Aggressive Attractive Friendly Trustworthy Wealthy
Aggressive 1.0000
Attractive -0.2839* 1.0000
Friendly -0.6507* 0.4358* 1.0000
Trustworthy -0.6641* 0.4319* 0.7835* 1.0000
Wealthy -0.3067* 0.4724* 0.3612* 0.3948* 1.0000
Note: 660 observations.
Panel B: Appearance Correlations, White Testers
Aggressive Attractive Friendly Trustworthy Wealthy
Aggressive 1.0000
Attractive -0.1501* 1.0000
Friendly -0.6051* 0.3766* 1.0000
Trustworthy -0.6189* 0.3383* 0.7746* 1.0000
Wealthy -0.2077* 0.5125* 0.2925* 0.3567* 1.0000
Note: 360 observations.
Panel C: Appearance Correlations, Black Testers
Aggressive Attractive Friendly Trustworthy Wealthy
Aggressive 1.0000
Attractive -0.4602* 1.0000
Friendly -0.6662* 0.5530* 1.0000
Trustworthy -0.6497* 0.6203* 0.7554* 1.0000
Wealthy -0.3814* 0.3674* 0.4039* 0.4190* 1.0000
Note: 210 observations.
Panel D: Appearance Correlations, S.Asian Testers
Aggressive Attractive Friendly Trustworthy Wealthy
Aggressive 1.0000
Attractive -0.2330* 1.0000
Friendly -0.5211* 0.2552* 1.0000
Trustworthy -0.5945* 0.2871* 0.6151* 1.0000
Wealthy -0.0586 0.2681* 0.0538 0.1408 1.0000
Note: 90 observations.
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level.
Table C.1: Tester Appearance Correlations
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C.2.4 Reduced form ethnic interactions
Dep. Var: Amount Given (£)
Driver Tester (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
White Black -0.565* -0.609** -0.605* -0.605* -0.662**
(0.329) (0.308) (0.317) (0.317) (0.318)
White Asian 0.282 0.236 0.226 0.226 0.407
(0.424) (0.394) (0.409) (0.409) (0.409)
Asian White -0.276 -0.200 -0.247 -0.247 -0.239
(0.210) (0.211) (0.216) (0.216) (0.214)
Asian Black -0.849*** -0.773*** -0.787*** -0.787*** -0.877***
(0.243) (0.231) (0.251) (0.251) (0.247)
Asian Asian -0.487 -0.550** -0.601** -0.601** -0.412
(0.305) (0.254) (0.304) (0.304) (0.301)
Constant 0.775 1.248* 1.569** 1.569** 1.122
(0.692) (0.750) (0.788) (0.788) (2.657)
Treatment Controls X X X X X
Driver Controls X X X X X
Tester Controls X X X X
Ride Controls X X X
Field Controls X X
City Controls X X
Appearance Controls X
Observations 255 254 254 254 254
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level. The estimates are obtained using observations from all
treatments, but we exclude observations where the driver is black. The number
of observations fall slightly as more controls are included due to missing entries.
Appearance Controls include measures of the Testers’ aggressiveness, attractive-
ness, friendliness, trustworthiness and wealthiness, as outlined in Section 4.4.1.
Observations with a white driver and a white Tester are taken as the baseline.
Table C.2: The Effects of Ethnic Interactions on Giving
C.2.5 Robustness checks
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# Alt. Hypothesis Family Outcome Unadjusted Adjusted
Result 4





2 HA: White 6= S.–Asian 0.37 0.37
3 HA: S.–Asian 6= Black 0.06* 0.12





5 HA: White 6= S.–Asian 0.88 0.88
6 HA: S.–Asian 6= Black 0.47 0.94





8 HA: White 6= S.–Asian 0.311 0.311
9 HA: S.–Asian 6= Black 0.025** 0.05**





11 HA: White 6= S.–Asian 0.13 0.26
12 HA: S.–Asian 6= Black 0.622 0.622




14 HA: White 6= S.–Asian 0.46 0.46
15 HA: S.–Asian 6= Black 0.45 0.90




17 HA: White 6= S.–Asian 0.003*** 0.006***
18 HA: S.–Asian 6= Black 0.90 0.90
Result 5






20 HA: White 6= S.–Asian 0.793 0.793
21 HA: S.–Asian 6= Black 0.088* 0.176
Result 6




23 HA: No Rep. 6= Rep., Black 0.593 0.593
24 HA: No Rep. 6= Rep., S.–Asian 0.278 0.556




26 HA: No Rep. 6= Rep., Black 0.624 0.624
27 HA: No Rep. 6= Rep., S.–Asian 0.506 1.00




29 HA: No Rep. 6= Rep., Black 0.397 0.397
30 HA: No Rep. 6= Rep., S.–Asian 0.15 0.3
Note: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Adjusted p-values are
adjusted using the Holm–Bonferroni procedure. All tests are two sided.
Table C.3: Adjusted p-values – Non–Parametric Testing
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Table # Result Model Explanatory Variable of Interest




(1) 0.002*** 0.615 2
2 (2) 0.003*** 0.279 0.106 3
3 (3) 0.000*** 0.129 0.06* 3
4 (4) 0.005*** 0.287 0.126 3




(1) 0.022** 0.197 2
7 (2) 0.048** 0.153 0.246 3
8 (3) 0.049** 0.312 0.286 3
9 (4) 0.057* 0.242 0.188 3
10 (5) 0.056* 1.00 1.00 8
Note: ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Adjusted p-values are adjusted using the Holm–Bonferroni procedure. All
tests are two sided. Column m outlines how many comparisons were made
within the family of hypotheses.




As we fail to find statistically significant differences stemming from treatments in Chap-
ter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we conduct a retrospective power analysis. This is done
in order to examine the probability that the observed null results are a consequence of
Type II error: the probability that we failed to reject the null hypothesis even though
it is false (a ‘false negative’). Although there is a large and heated debate surrounding
the usefulness and interpretation of post-hoc power analysis, there is no doubt that it
is useful for informing future research of required sample sizes (Hoenig & Heisey, 2001).
For each chapter, first, we calculate the statistical power of the experiment assuming
the observed effect size in our sample is equal to the effect size in the population. Second,
we calculate the power of the experiment if the observed effect size had been Medium
and Large, as defined by Cohen (1992). This is done using the number of observations
and standard deviations observed in each of the respective samples. This will shed light
on the extent to which our experimental planning regarding sample sizes is justified or
not.
Table D.1 outlines the calculated statistical power for each experiment and for each
effect size. Note, that the power to detect the observed treatment effect is 20% or
smaller in each case. This is to be expected, given the high calculated p–values, and
the one to one relationship between statistical power and calculated p–values (Hoenig
& Heisey, 2001).1 Further, for each chapter, Cohen (1992) would class the observed
treatment differences as Small. Had we observed Medium or Large effects in each
chapter conditional on the sample standard deviations being representative, as Table
1It is important to note that, in an experiment where a treatment comparison has a calculated
p–value of p = 0.05, the experiment is powered at only 50% (Hoenig & Heisey, 2001).
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Observed Effect Medium Effect∗ Large Effect∗∗
Chapter 2+ 20%++ 99% 99%
Chapter 3Λ 20%ΛΛ 75% 93%
Chapter 4o 14%oo 98% 99%
∗Medium effect size, d=0.5. ∗∗Large effect size, d = 0.8.
+Power calculated for the comparison of Bonus payments be-
tween the In–group and Out–group treatments. ++Observed ef-
fect size, d = 0.13.
ΛPower calculated for the comparison of dictator giving between
the Anonymous and English treatments. ΛΛObserved effect size,
d = 0.27.
oPower calculated for the comparison of giving as a percentage
of the expected fare between the No Reputation and Reputation
treatments. ooObserved effect size, d = 0.1.
Table D.1: Retrospective Power Analysis by Chapter
D.1 outlines, the experiments would have been powered at conventionally accepted
levels.
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